Networks; monopolies; network wars; conventions
Let's start from a very simple question: couldn't a network try (by whatever means) to seize power and reestablish a state?
One reason is that no network is powerful enough to do that. If they attempted it -- and historically it did happen -- an alliance of networks would form to counter them. Networks each have power bases -- in some case territorial, in some case social (religious groups) or economical (trade union, control over various common enterprises.) This is set up in such a way that no network has the necessary advantages for monopoly.
Forming a state would require alliance building; forming a ruling junta. There are two difficulties on that level. The first is ideological: wide ideological distances make alliances difficult. It's hard for a traditionalist-capitalist entity such as the Karneshgha to ally with the Metal Union, a socialist group for the purposes of getting a monopoly: there'd be no agreement on what kind of state to form. Conversely, the Karneshgha may ally with the Metal Union for pragmatic purposes; another traditionalist-capitalist would object; the Alwe'ashe would want a part in the military junta or denounce an alliance with commies; Land Reform would denounce the Metal Union as class traitors.
Yet another difficulty: a network is divided in subbranches, provincial chapters, local network. At each level different alliances may be formed. A network may form an alliance at the national level and be betrayed at a lower level.
About the one stable alliance is one who includes all factions of all ideologies -- and we end up with the current system.
But, what if it happens anyway? And in fact, it did happen. There were attempts at power grabs. The result is civil war.
An ambitious network must take into account the cost of a civil war; and yet another obstacle.
If feels natural for us to have a state in place to run things; especially so for those of us in functioning democracies where we expect the state to function. As a consequence, we cooperate with it, albeit grudingly at times. The last Erdan state, by contrast, was highly dysfunctional. The population did not cooperate with it. The Erdans cooperate with the current system because they value certain conditions: being judged and rules according to people they choose directly; they would not cooperate with judges or police enforced from above.
That problem can be solved given enough force! But that incurs a cost.
From a cost-benefit analysis setting up a state would require: a) building a complex alliance. b) fighting a civil war c) fighting a guerrila with people who don't want you anyway. To be balanced with simply being an influential and stable network under the current system, which is a fairly good position. The cost-benefit analysis is to be repeated at all levels. The Karneshgha leader in Ash'ashuma may feel he can win the civil war; his captain in Gonsen province may feel differently.
Another reason is ideological, and I don't mean that in a bad way. Like I said, the Erdan feel, from experience that states are unworkable and oppressive. This opinion is shared by the network leaders. Any Earth politician transplanted magically at the head of a network would try building a state because that's what we expect. The Erdans have no expectation that states are better of functional.
Taking Earth, and specifically the Western world as an analogy: everybody knows, from experience, that one-party states are oppressive and dysfunctional. Political parties try to make gains over their opponents whenever possible, but generally don't try to build a one party state. (There are of course exceptions, just as there are in Erdani. But the attitude is so internalized that even our Nazis feel the need to insist they are not Nazis even while dressed in full SS parade uniforms.)
Currently the situation is such that no network could hope to gain a monopoly. Steps are taken to make sure it stays that way:
- Networks are not allowed to gain a monopoly in any geographical area.
- Key businesses must be shared between networks.
- Public goods: schools, the army, banks, exist as several concurrent institution, and all of these must be controlled as a network.
- Discipline within a network must be somewhat lax; central leadership in a network should not interfere excessively in the ruling of its sub-network.
- The leadership of a network must have near-unanimous support. In other words, network splits are allowed and encouraged.
How are the rules enforced? This is where a collective body is in place: the convention.
The convention meets at infrequent intervals, but from once every year to once every five. It comprises the heads of all significant networks. New networks should be invited if they're significant enough.
One of its function is to address dispute between networks, and breaches in discipline. Typically a network that bullies sub-networks too much would have to offer financial compensation. A network grabbing a monopoly on, say, oil, would be fined and asked to sell shares to a few other networks.
Decision is normally by consensus, or various forms of qualified majority (always more than half.)
Possible sanctions include:
- Banning the network from the convention for a set period of time. This means the punished networks misses out on all the good deals.
- Outlawing the network. (Local and/or provincial subnetworks are given opportunities: either independance or joining a friendly other network.)
- Forced retirement of the network leadership.
- Authorized assassination.
No one is forcing any network to attend. Networks leaders have tried to wriggle out of trouble by setting up an alternate convention or declaring the convention illegitimate. Over time their position proved not tenable.
On the assassination parts, it happened, historically, that conflicts were settled by
network wars and
assassination. These historical events have been grandfathered in as the clause that network wars can be pardoned as long as proper compensation is paid and no civilians are harmed (ie, the victims should be formal network members and if possible higher ups.)
Network war exists as a theoretical possibility but has not occured in practice for the past 60 years -- forced retirement of network leaders is substituted instead.
Assassinations have happened, at unfrequent intervals. (All in all the system is not significantly more violent than one of our democracies, where assassinations do occasionally happen.)
Local conventions
The
national convention has
local counterparts as provincial, local, city and town conventions. These include the local networks and follow roughly the same rules. They meet much more regularly: the rule is that conflicts should be handled as locally as possible.
Still, couldn't a state be established?
The possibility exists. A network or a junta could get a monopoly, kick out its rivals and form a state. Just as any political regime, the Erdan system could decay and change into something else.
Again, making a real-world analogy, there are any number of ways a democracy could become a dictatorship.
Getting back to Erdani, it would take a long time, but it's entirely plausible that going back in, say, fifty years, we'd find a more familiar state arrangement.
Local monopolies
It's difficult to establish a monopoly at the national level -- what about at the local level? The barriers to a local network gaining monopoly are much lower.
This is in part the job of the local convention to handle conflict so that it doesn't happen. The higher echelons of a network are also responsible for the local branch not trying to get a monopoly. If a network tries to establish a local monopoly, its rivals will ask for help from their upper echelons; The upper echelons of the offending networks may intervene as well -- if they do not, this can be brought to the provincial and the national conventions, with fines applied.
It's understood a network can get a strong local base but leave space to rivals one way or another.
As a metaphor, a network can be said to "control" an area. In actuality, their power there is always limited.
The Amanelo clan controls
Irawoshas in that it handles most of the security and justice service there; other clans such as the Alwe'ashe still operate there, though. Anything involving labor law is under the control of the Metal Union; labour disputes can be tried by the Amanelo or the Metal Union. There's a strong Rilril present so all four Rilril clans are present.
The Amanelo also, "control" the Northern Territories, an even bolder claim as they are not even present; they merely have friendly contacts with the other networks.
As it is the Amanelo are wealthy and powerful; if they tried to ban the Alwe'ashe from operating there they would get in trouble at the National Convention. If they tried to actually rule the Northern Territories, friendship with the local clans would cease and rivals would be very eager to take over that profitable relationship.