Authoritarianism and anti-authoritarianism: do they exist?

[Travis B.]

but it seems to me that the general problem with it is, well, what do we do when a council has too much power? how do we make sure it doesn't devolve into feudalism? sure, general councils can keep lower councils at bay, but in return local councils influence and can capture general ones, especially when there WAAAAY too many political decisions being made for any one person to keep track of: then again, feudalism was stable for many centuries, maybe radically democratic feudalism, like plutocracy, isn't the end of the world either, and can be just a flaw in the system.

The key thing is a council only in most cases, outside of the application of universal jurisdiction in areas like human rights law and military action in the defense of the new society or its comrades elsewhere, only has power over its own members and members of councils that send delegates to it, their capital, and their interactions with other outside organizations.

Within a council, its members can always vote directly democratically to change its decisions. If there are those within a council that sufficiently disagree with others in the council in an irreconcilable fashion, they could vote to split the council into multiple separate councils, if there are a smaller number of people who are misbehaving in a fashion that cannot otherwise be managed, a vote could be held to expel them from the council.

Conversely, higher-level councils cannot be unilaterally overruled by the lower-level councils which send delegates to them except through those lower-level councils changing the higher-level councils' decisions by either instructing their delegates to do or recalling their delegates and sending new delegates with a new mandate to do so, which would then have to be voted upon by the higher-level council. Consequently, if a higher-level council has voted to establish a law that, e.g., 'thou shalt not murder', a lower-level council could not just decide otherwise.

About 'feudalism', the key thing is that feudalism is based on private property and feudal land tenure, which would be specifically at odds with the agreed-upon principles of the founding of the new society. If a particular council devolved to operating in such terms, other councils could refuse to recognize any claims to such 'rights'.

[Raphael]

Feudalism is based on private property? That's news to me. I'm not sure property rights in the modern sense existed in medieval Europe.

I'd say if recall elections should be allowed - and that's a big if - they should only happen under the condition that in order for a recall to be valid, a specific replacement for the recalled person needs to get at least as many votes as the recalled person got in their most recent regular election or, if they themselves got their office as the result of a recall after the most recent regular election, as they got in that recall. Without that condition, it's too easy for determined, passionate, and well-organized minorities to hijack the process.

[Travis B.]

Feudalism is based on private property? That's news to me. I'm not sure property rights in the modern sense existed in medieval Europe.

Feudalism is not based on the modern conception of private property, yes, but it is based on the idea of title over land one does not work or occupy oneself, combined with the renting of land in return for service (with there very often being multiple levels of people renting land from one another). This is very much incompatible with a society based on the right to possession based on use, where no one rents land or capital from anyone else, and title simply does not exist.

[Travis B.]

I'd say if recall elections should be allowed - and that's a big if - they should only happen under the condition that in order for a recall to be valid, a specific replacement for the recalled person needs to get at least as many votes as the recalled person got in their most recent regular election or, if they themselves got their office as the result of a recall after the most recent regular election, as they got in that recall. Without that condition, it's too easy for determined, passionate, and well-organized minorities to hijack the process.

The problem with this approach is that if someone manages to get a very large proportion of votes when they are initially elected, it may be effectively impossible to recall them if they then disobey their mandate but remain popular enough with a certain minority to accrue enough votes to vote them out, essentially allowing entrenched minorities to effectively entrench the status quo against the will of the majority.

A better approach would be to require a sizeable quorum for recall elections, to prevent minorities from taking advantage of limited turnouts to recall people regardless of what most people actually think.

[Raphael]

I'd say if recall elections should be allowed - and that's a big if - they should only happen under the condition that in order for a recall to be valid, a specific replacement for the recalled person needs to get at least as many votes as the recalled person got in their most recent regular election or, if they themselves got their office as the result of a recall after the most recent regular election, as they got in that recall. Without that condition, it's too easy for determined, passionate, and well-organized minorities to hijack the process.

The problem with this approach is that if someone manages to get a very large proportion of votes when they are initially elected, it may be effectively impossible to recall them if they then disobey their mandate but remain popular enough with a certain minority to accrue enough votes to vote them out, essentially allowing entrenched minorities to effectively entrench the status quo against the will of the majority.

I'm not entirely sure I can parse that sentence from "remain popular enough" onwards.

[Travis B.]

I'd say if recall elections should be allowed - and that's a big if - they should only happen under the condition that in order for a recall to be valid, a specific replacement for the recalled person needs to get at least as many votes as the recalled person got in their most recent regular election or, if they themselves got their office as the result of a recall after the most recent regular election, as they got in that recall. Without that condition, it's too easy for determined, passionate, and well-organized minorities to hijack the process.

The problem with this approach is that if someone manages to get a very large proportion of votes when they are initially elected, it may be effectively impossible to recall them if they then disobey their mandate but remain popular enough with a certain minority to accrue enough votes to vote them out, essentially allowing entrenched minorities to effectively entrench the status quo against the will of the majority.

I'm not entirely sure I can parse that sentence from "remain popular enough" onwards.

What I mean is that if someone gets voted in with a high number/proportion of votes, but then disobeys their mandate while remaining popular with a certain minority, it would be possible for that minority to force their will on the majority by preventing a sufficient vote number/proportion to be accrued to vote the person who has disobeyed their mandate out. By this minorities could effectively entrench their will against the will of the majority.

Of course in some areas entrenchment is necessary; for instance, voting to expel someone from a council should be entrenched by requiring at least a supermajority vote if not greater.

[Raphael]

Ah, thank you. How about, "In order for a recall to be valid, both the recall and the specific replacement for the recalled person must get a number of votes equal to at least half the total number of votes cast in the most recent regular election for the office"?

That said, recalls generally only make sense in the context of single-seat-electoral-district systems, which have their own problems, even when they're not strictly FPTP.

[Travis B.]

Ah, thank you. How about, "In order for a recall to be valid, both the recall and the specific replacement for the recalled person must get a number of votes equal to at least half the total number of votes cast in the most recent regular election for the office"?

That's better, but I don't see the advantage over simply requiring a certain-proportion quorum for recalls to be valid.

That said, recalls generally only make sense in the context of single-seat-electoral-district systems, which have their own problems, even when they're not strictly FPTP.

I think you are thinking in terms of parliamentarian government, which is very different from a council republic. In a council republic the key thing is that delegates are to typically elected from the number of a given council and given a mandate by the members of that council, and the whole point of immediate and arbitrary recalls is to bind delegates to the will of the council that elected them and enable easily and quickly replacing those delegates when they do not follow said council's will (unlike in parliamentarian government, where representatives are either subject to party discipline or are free to vote as they choose).

As for single-seat-electoral-district systems and FPTP, it would depend on the specifics of how a given council would operate, but even if a council elected delegates in, say, a ranked-choice basis with multiple delegates being elected by a given council the concept of recalling delegates would still be applicable.

[Raphael]

Ah, thank you. How about, "In order for a recall to be valid, both the recall and the specific replacement for the recalled person must get a number of votes equal to at least half the total number of votes cast in the most recent regular election for the office"?

That's better, but I don't see the advantage over simply requiring a certain-proportion quorum for recalls to be valid.

I'm absolutely against quorum, as in, "how many people took part in a vote", rules. They can be abused for manipulative maneuvers too easily. I think procedural rules should be such that when a proposed measure (including an election or recall) is voted on, it shouldn't make a difference whether the people who are against the measure show up to vote against it or boycott the vote.

That said, recalls generally only make sense in the context of single-seat-electoral-district systems, which have their own problems, even when they're not strictly FPTP.

I think you are thinking in terms of parliamentarian government, which is very different from a council republic. In a council republic the key thing is that delegates are to typically elected from the number of a given council and given a mandate by the members of that council, and the whole point of immediate and arbitrary recalls is to bind delegates to the will of the council that elected them and enable easily and quickly replacing those delegates when they do not follow said council's will (unlike in parliamentarian government, where representatives are either subject to party discipline or are free to vote as they choose).

I think the difference might be less clear in practice than in theory.

As for single-seat-electoral-district systems and FPTP, it would depend on the specifics of how a given council would operate, but even if a council elected delegates in, say, a ranked-choice basis with multiple delegates being elected by a given council the concept of recalling delegates would still be applicable.

How so?

[Torco]

About 'feudalism', the key thing is that feudalism is based on private property and feudal land tenure, which would be specifically at odds with the agreed-upon principles of the founding of the new society. If a particular council devolved to operating in such terms, other councils could refuse to recognize any claims to such 'rights'.

I know, feudalism isn't the best word for it, but... i don't know, factionalism? something like that. what i mean is groups becoming dominant, or trying to, over other groups, and the resulting byzantine conflicts that often happens in systems of governments where there are many, many different actors, like the HRE. even in a system where means of production are collectively owned and managed by democratic worker councils, large disparities in resource endowments say, access to a massive copper deposit, can lead to things like massive income inequality, inequality in the level of control people and groups can exert over various levels of government, over various councils they belong to, to regulatory capture, and even social classes reemerging, but because people marry and so on, whereas companies don't, you don't get this effect of one ruling class ruling the country, but a bunch of somewhat independent ruling classes -defined by membership in particularly rich councils- fighting over this or that. oh, you don't think the gold miner's union should be as powerful as it is? okay, we'll take our business elsewhere then.
__

feudalism is indeed based on private property of land... or, at least, something very similar to it. the relationship of the lord to his land is not unlike the relationship of the business owner over his company. feudalism is of course vastly diverse, or was, but the general idea is "i own this land, so i get to say what happens on it, and of course, i'll only want things that benefit me to happen on it".

like, okay, our idea of property is based on some government-run registry [when i own a house, it will be true that i own my house mostly cause the conservador de bienes raíces will say I do] whereas the feudal idea of property is to do with an endowment from the king, but that's not such a fundamental difference.

[Travis B.]

Ah, thank you. How about, "In order for a recall to be valid, both the recall and the specific replacement for the recalled person must get a number of votes equal to at least half the total number of votes cast in the most recent regular election for the office"?

That's better, but I don't see the advantage over simply requiring a certain-proportion quorum for recalls to be valid.

I'm absolutely against quorum, as in, "how many people took part in a vote", rules. They can be abused for manipulative maneuvers too easily. I think procedural rules should be such that when a proposed measure (including an election or recall) is voted on, it shouldn't make a difference whether the people who are against the measure show up to vote against it or boycott the vote.

I myself would not be against a rule that not being present to vote on a measure would be equivalent to an against vote.

That said, recalls generally only make sense in the context of single-seat-electoral-district systems, which have their own problems, even when they're not strictly FPTP.

I think you are thinking in terms of parliamentarian government, which is very different from a council republic. In a council republic the key thing is that delegates are to typically elected from the number of a given council and given a mandate by the members of that council, and the whole point of immediate and arbitrary recalls is to bind delegates to the will of the council that elected them and enable easily and quickly replacing those delegates when they do not follow said council's will (unlike in parliamentarian government, where representatives are either subject to party discipline or are free to vote as they choose).

I think the difference might be less clear in practice than in theory.

The whole idea behind delegates versus representatives is that delegates are to enact the will of those who elected them whereas representatives will carry out either the will of their party or their conscience. The whole idea behind delegates being arbitrarily and immediately recallable is to ensure delegates do what they are told by those who elected them.

As for single-seat-electoral-district systems and FPTP, it would depend on the specifics of how a given council would operate, but even if a council elected delegates in, say, a ranked-choice basis with multiple delegates being elected by a given council the concept of recalling delegates would still be applicable.

How so?

Councils do not involve voting for a party, which is specifically the case where recalls are difficult to apply.

[Raphael]

Travis, I have a question about your "councils would have universal jurisdiction over human rights violations or other really serious stuff" rule would work. How would conflicting claims over such jurisdiction between different councils be resolved?

Let's say a resident of the Albany neighborhood is accused of having brutally murdered a resident of the Bobington neighborhood. They deny the allegation. Albany rallies behind them, Bobington rallies behind the family and friends of their alleged victim.

Now, murdering someone is clearly a serious human rights violation. But that's true of framing and falsely punishing someone, too.

So, the Council of Bobington says, "We're claiming universal jurisdiction against that person for having murdered one of our residents." And the Council of Albany says, "We're claiming universal jurisdiction against the members of the Council of Bobington for falsely punishing our resident." Cue civil war...

The whole idea behind delegates versus representatives is that delegates are to enact the will of those who elected them whereas representatives will carry out either the will of their party or their conscience. The whole idea behind delegates being arbitrarily and immediately recallable is to ensure delegates do what they are told by those who elected them.

Again, I'd say that difference is more theoretical than practical. You talk about how officeholders should, ideally, interpret their rule. That doesn't necessarily tell us much about how they will interpret their rule

As for single-seat-electoral-district systems and FPTP, it would depend on the specifics of how a given council would operate, but even if a council elected delegates in, say, a ranked-choice basis with multiple delegates being elected by a given council the concept of recalling delegates would still be applicable.

How so?

Councils do not involve voting for a party, which is specifically the case where recalls are difficult to apply.

OK, let me rephrase my question: if several members of one of your councils get elected together, to represent one street or one subdivision of an organisation or whatever, how would the recall of one of them work? What would the precise rules be?

[Torco]

huh.... vanilla murder is not a human rights violation? I mean, okay, in a certain sense it is, but only in the sense tomatoes and chili peppers are fruits. when people say crimes against humanity (lesa humanidad, crimes contre l'humanite, etc) they don't mean any old murder. then again, that's tangential to your example, it can be modded to be, say, that the Albanians are bombing and disappearing the Bobingtonians, bombing Bobingtoninan hospitals, cutting off their water and the all the rest of it.

oh.... right, i see what you mean now... yeah, no, in principle you could answer something like "a higher council settles them, one to which both the Bobington and Albany councils answer and send delegates to, but.... what if either one of those councils don't answer to any higher council? what if the mining worker's council doesn't recognize the authority of any other councils and just hoards all of the copper, with guns and what have you? yeah, it's a good objection.

[Travis B.]

Travis, I have a question about your "councils would have universal jurisdiction over human rights violations or other really serious stuff" rule would work. How would conflicting claims over such jurisdiction between different councils be resolved?

Let's say a resident of the Albany neighborhood is accused of having brutally murdered a resident of the Bobington neighborhood. They deny the allegation. Albany rallies behind them, Bobington rallies behind the family and friends of their alleged victim.

Now, murdering someone is clearly a serious human rights violation. But that's true of framing and falsely punishing someone, too.

So, the Council of Bobington says, "We're claiming universal jurisdiction against that person for having murdered one of our residents." And the Council of Albany says, "We're claiming universal jurisdiction against the members of the Council of Bobington for falsely punishing our resident." Cue civil war...

I mean things like crimes against humanity, war crimes, and piracy here, the kinds of things where states today often claim universal jurisdiction.

Edit: You could say the very same thing about our current international system; you have the same thing about if someone from Albonia is accused of murdering a resident of Bobania, and then flees back to Albonia; people in Bobania are outraged and their government demands their extradition to face trial in Bobania, but as Albonia has poor relations with Bobania many people in Albonia really have no problem with the murder of a Bobanian and the Albonian government refuses to extradite the accused murderer. How is this any different?

The whole idea behind delegates versus representatives is that delegates are to enact the will of those who elected them whereas representatives will carry out either the will of their party or their conscience. The whole idea behind delegates being arbitrarily and immediately recallable is to ensure delegates do what they are told by those who elected them.

Again, I'd say that difference is more theoretical than practical. You talk about how officeholders should, ideally, interpret their rule. That doesn't necessarily tell us much about how they will interpret their rule

If officeholders ignore the directions of those who elected them, then they will most likely get recalled. If they ignore being recalled, that falls into the same category as things like politicians refusing to leave office at the ends of their terms...

How so?

Councils do not involve voting for a party, which is specifically the case where recalls are difficult to apply.

OK, let me rephrase my question: if several members of one of your councils get elected together, to represent one street or one subdivision of an organisation or whatever, how would the recall of one of them work? What would the precise rules be?

The way things would work would be up to the individual council, but a typical way would be as follows: A vote to recall a specific delegate would be proposed and held. If more than 50% of those eligible to vote vote for their being recalled, another vote would be held as to whom to replace them with would be held. If someone gains a majority of votes to replace the recalled delegate, the recalled delegate would be removed from their seat in the higher council and be replaced with the newly-elected delegate. (The details may vary; e.g. some councils could opt for an instant run-off system for selecting a replacement delegate rather requiring a single person to gain an absolute majority on the first vote.)

[Raphael]

Torco: When a group of cops or soldiers murder someone, that's clearly a human rights violation. So why not when it's done by someone wearing civilian clothes? The end result for the person on the receiving end is the same.

I know that the world is full of people who, when they hear about someone being mercilessly murdered, first have to consult their preferred abstract theoretical intellectual framework of choice before they can decide whether they see it as a good thing or a bad thing, but I try to avoid being like that.

I mean things like crimes against humanity, war crimes, and piracy here, the kinds of things where states today often claim universal jurisdiction.

I'd say that makes the kind of scenario I describe more likely, because anyone in a prominent enough position to either commit or be unjustly accused of having committed crimes like that is likely to have both a lot of passionate supporters in some places and a lot of passionate opponents in some other places.

The way things would work would be up to the individual council, but a typical way would be as follows: A vote to recall a specific delegate would be proposed and held. If more than 50% of those eligible to vote vote for their being recalled, another vote would be held as to whom to replace them with would be held. If someone gains a majority of votes to replace the recalled delegate, the recalled delegate would be removed from their seat in the higher council and be replaced with the newly-elected delegate. (The details may vary; e.g. some councils could opt for an instant run-off system for selecting a replacement delegate rather requiring a single person to gain an absolute majority on the first vote.)

Hmmmmm. What if the reason why a council elects several as opposed to just one delegate is to allow for representation for minority points of view within the council? In that case, under your rules, the majority could completely sabotage that principle by simply recalling all the delegates who were elected with the votes of minority points of view.

Your system basically provides for only local majority representation on the lowest councils, only council-level majority representation on the higher councils, and so on. I don't think that would be a good idea at all.

[Travis B.]

Torco: When a group of cops or soldiers murder someone, that's clearly a human rights violation. So why not when it's done by someone wearing civilian clothes? The end result for the person on the receiving end is the same.

I know that the world is full of people who, when they hear about someone being mercilessly murdered, first have to consult their preferred abstract theoretical intellectual framework of choice before they can decide whether they see it as a good thing or a bad thing, but I try to avoid being like that.

When it is an ordinary civilian who murders someone, it is less likely that they will not be held accountable by those who have jurisdiction over them, whereas when its a group of cops or soldiers who murder someone, it is likely that those above them will not hold them responsibility, meaning that it is up to someone else to do so.

I mean things like crimes against humanity, war crimes, and piracy here, the kinds of things where states today often claim universal jurisdiction.

I'd say that makes the kind of scenario I describe more likely, because anyone in a prominent enough position to either commit or be unjustly accused of having committed crimes like that is likely to have both a lot of passionate supporters in some places and a lot of passionate opponents in some other places.

That's a problem that already exists, so it is not like a problem specific to the system proposed here.

The way things would work would be up to the individual council, but a typical way would be as follows: A vote to recall a specific delegate would be proposed and held. If more than 50% of those eligible to vote vote for their being recalled, another vote would be held as to whom to replace them with would be held. If someone gains a majority of votes to replace the recalled delegate, the recalled delegate would be removed from their seat in the higher council and be replaced with the newly-elected delegate. (The details may vary; e.g. some councils could opt for an instant run-off system for selecting a replacement delegate rather requiring a single person to gain an absolute majority on the first vote.)

Hmmmmm. What if the reason why a council elects several as opposed to just one delegate is to allow for representation for minority points of view within the council? In that case, under your rules, the majority could completely sabotage that principle by simply recalling all the delegates who were elected with the votes of minority points of view.

If multiple delegates are elected with that as a goal, then they could set the threshold for initially voting on whether to recall a delegate to somewhat above 50%.

Your system basically provides for only local majority representation on the lowest councils, only council-level majority representation on the higher councils, and so on. I don't think that would be a good idea at all.

But consider current representative government, where people only infrequently get the opportunity to vote on representatives or their parties, the people in practice have very few choices, recalls are either exceedingly difficult or impossible, and the people have practically no control over what those representatives actually do once elected. Is that at all better than this even when one tries to see this proposal in as negative of a light as possible (i.e. you seem to be objecting to the very idea of majority rule here)?

[Raphael]

(i.e. you seem to be objecting to the very idea of majority rule here)?

I'm not so much objecting to the idea of majority rule as to the idea of FPTP, which your system is based on, even if in a different way than traditional legislative elections.

[zompist]

One way for this is to have groups established to help provide capital to proposed new companies, funded by other councils such as those for geographical areas or companies, but in a hands-off fashion so as to allow them to specialize in their role of establishing new companies which other organizations would be less suited for, with councils for geographical areas acting in a more general oversight role, just like how municipalities in our present society control things like zoning and utilities.
[...]
I would say that the councils corresponding to geographical areas would get the last word if there were conflicts.

land in such a system wouldn't be expensive, as you can't profit out of owning it personally, and councils who own land have an incentive to, well, give them to their members (and, depending on the decisions made by provincial councils, might even be free), and having acquired a plot people could probably pick between building one themselves (it's not thaaaat difficult, especially if there's UBI to keep buying food while you build) or comissioning the construction of one to their local mason's guild in exchange for good old money.

I think both these replies miss the NIMBY problem. ("Not In My Backyard.") If people run a neighborhood their impulse will be to keep outsiders out. People don't like change, don't like their views obstructed, don't like a charming one-story bungalow replaced by a six-story apartment house, don't like a big store or factory moving in, prefer the vacant lot over there as a park rather than as a new house, don't like new houses they consider cheap, don't like new houses they consider extravagant.

Leftists often get into a bad habit of blaming "capitalism" for everything. It may make things worse, but it is not responsible for all housing problems. As I noted, an owner-managed building can have spectacular, even unhinged internal politics. And co-ops with impeccable leftist credentials may be no better. Give a local council total control over their area and I guarantee they'll act as described above.

I don't say these problems are un-solveable, just that they require more attention than "oh the councils will happily manage the land."

FWIW, for one group on Almea (the elcari) I posited a very different model of ownership: you own the tools and land you use, you don't own the tools and land you don't. So empty space, including a house no one lives in, can be taken over.

I don't know if Chile is like Peru or Brazil in this regard— generally open land in a shantytown will get used by someone because no one really has land title anyway. But you know, some urban planning is a good thing: it's a hassle to get electricity and water in those shantytowns, or connect them to a sewer system. A better system would keep the ability to claim and build on unused land, but provide better ways to integrate it into the urban infrastructure.

[Travis B.]

(i.e. you seem to be objecting to the very idea of majority rule here)?

I'm not so much objecting to the idea of majority rule as to the idea of FPTP, which your system is based on, even if in a different way than traditional legislative elections.

One could of course object, conversely, to party-list parliamentarian politics on the basis of that the average voter has very little control over the actual politics of the parties if they are not specifically a member of a particular party and involved in its internal politics.

[Raphael]

FWIW, for one group on Almea (the elcari) I posited a very different model of ownership: you own the tools and land you use, you don't own the tools and land you don't.

Hm, if I understand Travis correctly, that seems to be more or less what he's proposing in that regard.