Nationalism and Culture

[Travis B.]

Don't get me wrong, I'm not saying reparation shouldn't happen, but I don't think that looking for cut-off points or for rules when to pay or not to pay reparations is wrong. After all, our law systems also have statutes of limtiations.

I think you may have missed my follow-up where I say exactly this. My disagreement with Travis seems to be that he thinks the cutoff should be a single human lifetime and I think that's too short. If I grow up deprived and traumatised because of something done to my parents, why should I be denied compensation?

Moreover, I think all of this talk about sorting people into categories is a willful conflation of personal responsibility with institutional responsibility. When it comes to something like genocide or redlining, we're talking a whole different class of crime than your dad robbing my dad. These were actions taken by institutional actors--either governments or private agents with the approval (tacit or explicit) of governmental authorities--whose actions impacted all of society. The US government of today is a direct successor of the US government which enabled widespread segregation of and discrimination against Blacks and other people of colour; it doesn't get to shrug off its responsibility just because the people running it today decide they don't want to shoulder it. Nobody who signed the Webster–Ashburton Treaty is still alive today; does that mean we get to seize whatever bits of Canada we want?

About the cutoff, to me it gets fuzzy when clear past policies translate into lasting present-day impacts upon people alive today, but the key thing is how people alive today are affected, not what was done to people no longer alive today. The case of the treatment of black people in the US by the US government and slaveowners and like is notable in that there are definite lasting impacts upon black people alive today, and these are what should be recompensed. (Conversely, the Mongol genocides have little to no practical consequences for people alive today, so it makes no sense to recompense people for them.)

About personal responsibility versus institutional responsibility, one can definitely say that institutions with continuity with the past are responsible for their past actions, but at the same time, when it comes to reparations, they are ultimately paid for by taxpayers (money for reparations have to come from somewhere, and even if governments pay for them by printing money, that is still an implicit tax through inflation), and hence are only just when those taxpayers themselves are guilty, directly or indirectly, of the crimes in question. (Hence reparations by Germany for the Holocaust were just in nature.)

[zompist]

About personal responsibility versus institutional responsibility, one can definitely say that institutions with continuity with the past are responsible for their past actions, but at the same time, when it comes to reparations, they are ultimately paid for by taxpayers (money for reparations have to come from somewhere, and even if governments pay for them by printing money, that is still an implicit tax through inflation), and hence are only just when those taxpayers themselves are guilty, directly or indirectly, of the crimes in question.

That seems like a criterion you've made up on the spot, because it makes very little sense, and has no relationship to the way any government payments are made, and no relationship to how actual reparations have worked.

There are at least four cases where either the federal government or states have paid reparations. In no cases was this a tax on the guilty parties, most of whom were long dead. One of the programs, for victims of the Tuskegee experiments, included payment to heirs.

[Travis B.]

About personal responsibility versus institutional responsibility, one can definitely say that institutions with continuity with the past are responsible for their past actions, but at the same time, when it comes to reparations, they are ultimately paid for by taxpayers (money for reparations have to come from somewhere, and even if governments pay for them by printing money, that is still an implicit tax through inflation), and hence are only just when those taxpayers themselves are guilty, directly or indirectly, of the crimes in question.

That seems like a criterion you've made up on the spot, because it makes very little sense, and has no relationship to the way any government payments are made, and no relationship to how actual reparations have worked.

There are at least four cases where either the federal government or states have paid reparations. In no cases was this a tax on the guilty parties, most of whom were long dead. One of the programs, for victims of the Tuskegee experiments, included payment to heirs.

My point is that money paid out must come from somewhere, either by taxing the public to obtain said money (not necessarily explicitly), by diverting money from other programs to make up the difference, or by printing money (i.e. taxing people indirectly through inflation). This does not have to be an explicit tax by any means, and in the cases your link mentions, it was not. So naturally, if the guilty parties are long dead, that means effectively penalizing the public today for the crimes of yesterday.

Of course, if the guilty parties are not dead, then this is a form of collective punishment for their actions. In the case of the mistreatment of black people in America, this continues to this very day, so you could say that this would apply in the case of reparations for such. Likewise, reparations by Germany for the Holocaust is an example of this because the perpetrators of the Holocaust, and those who silently went along with them, were mostly very much alive (aside from the few who were executed) at the time of said reparations.

[zompist]

There are at least four cases where either the federal government or states have paid reparations. In no cases was this a tax on the guilty parties, most of whom were long dead. One of the programs, for victims of the Tuskegee experiments, included payment to heirs.

My point is that money paid out must come from somewhere, either by taxing the public to obtain said money (not necessarily explicitly), by diverting money from other programs to make up the difference, or by printing money (i.e. taxing people indirectly through inflation). This does not have to be an explicit tax by any means, and in the cases your link mentions, it was not. So naturally, if the guilty parties are long dead, that means effectively penalizing the public today for the crimes of yesterday.

It means making the US government responsible for the US government's crimes.

There are tradeoffs everywhere, but it's very strange that you seem to believe that an institution is not responsible for its crimes any more if the actual perps are dead, even if its victims are alive.

If (say) Amazon owed you a $300 refund, or owed the government a $3 million fine for a crime, would it be off the hook if Jeff Bezos died?

Institutions work differently from individuals, and one of the differences is precisely that their obligations are corporate, not that of their employees. Your principle, if consistently applied, would make it impossible to sign a long-term contract with any institution (a government, a corporation, a university, etc.) or hold it accountable for its behavior.

[hwhatting]

I think you may have missed my follow-up where I say exactly this. My disagreement with Travis seems to be that he thinks the cutoff should be a single human lifetime and I think that's too short. If I grow up deprived and traumatised because of something done to my parents, why should I be denied compensation?

Indeed, I missed that; seems you posted it while I composed my post and I didn't notice it. I agree on a lifetime being too short in many cases.

The following is not directly aimed at specific comments, but does touch on issues raised in yoir, Travis's, and zompist's comments.
(1) Define the involved: in some cases, it's relatively clear who were the perpetrators and which instititutions ordered, encouraged, or condoned the activities. On that side, the institutional principle can be used to define responsibility and Involvement. But it can still be unclear who exactly would be the recipient of the reparations. Should it go to persons claiming descent? Should it go to successor communities? Do those even exist? Here it's much more difficult to separate the personal and the institutional. This is one of the issues on the current discussions on compensations for the genocide on the Herero and Nama by the German Colonial Government - the German Government is discussing this with the Namibian Government, but (simplifying a bit) representatives of the Herero and Nama demand that (a) the negotiations should be held with them and (b) the compensation should go to the Herero and Namas, and not be invested into wider projects that would benefit them only indirectly, as the Namibian Government wants.
(2) The question of obligation - while some cases of reparations are based on treaties or came about by judicial review, most cases I know are not due to legal obligations, but due to political pressure, activism, and a general change of attitudes to the past. Actions that were legal or even celebrated a couple of generations past (or maybe not even that long ago) are now seen as reprehensible and needing to be recompensed for. So they're more of a moral than a legal obligation. And that means the rules still need to be made up, coalitions need to be built, and people need to be convinced that their tax money should be used for that.

[Travis B.]

(1) Define the involved: in some cases, it's relatively clear who were the perpetrators and which instititutions ordered, encouraged, or condoned the activities. On that side, the institutional principle can be used to define responsibility and Involvement. But it can still be unclear who exactly would be the recipient of the reparations. Should it go to persons claiming descent? Should it go to successor communities? Do those even exist? Here it's much more difficult to separate the personal and the institutional. This is one of the issues on the current discussions on compensations for the genocide on the Herero and Nama by the German Colonial Government - the German Government is discussing this with the Namibian Government, but (simplifying a bit) representatives of the Herero and Nama demand that (a) the negotiations should be held with them and (b) the compensation should go to the Herero and Namas, and not be invested into wider projects that would benefit them only indirectly, as the Namibian Government wants.
(2) The question of obligation - while some cases of reparations are based on treaties or came about by judicial review, most cases I know are not due to legal obligations, but due to political pressure, activism, and a general change of attitudes to the past. Actions that were legal or even celebrated a couple of generations past (or maybe not even that long ago) are now seen as reprehensible and needing to be recompensed for. So they're more of a moral than a legal obligation. And that means the rules still need to be made up, coalitions need to be built, and people need to be convinced that their tax money should be used for that.

These are all important points IMO. In the case of reparations for black people in America, one thing would be whether such should simply be direct payments to the descendents of slaves (if this is specifically to be reparations for slavery alone) or to all black people in America (if this is for everything we've ever done to them regardless of whether they are specifically descended from slaves or not - this likely would be less problematic in that it would not require proving one's descent from slaves), or whether such should be in the form of increased investment in black communities (e.g. putting money into education, health care, infrastructure, and promoting job creation within black communities), or some combination of both. One problem with direct payments is deciding who gets them, not just because of whether one has to prove descent from slaves, but also because of people of mixed ancestry. Also, IMO, focusing on investment within the black community is likely to have greater long-term positive impact than direct payments alone.

[Travis B.]

There are at least four cases where either the federal government or states have paid reparations. In no cases was this a tax on the guilty parties, most of whom were long dead. One of the programs, for victims of the Tuskegee experiments, included payment to heirs.

My point is that money paid out must come from somewhere, either by taxing the public to obtain said money (not necessarily explicitly), by diverting money from other programs to make up the difference, or by printing money (i.e. taxing people indirectly through inflation). This does not have to be an explicit tax by any means, and in the cases your link mentions, it was not. So naturally, if the guilty parties are long dead, that means effectively penalizing the public today for the crimes of yesterday.

It means making the US government responsible for the US government's crimes.

There are tradeoffs everywhere, but it's very strange that you seem to believe that an institution is not responsible for its crimes any more if the actual perps are dead, even if its victims are alive.

If (say) Amazon owed you a $300 refund, or owed the government a $3 million fine for a crime, would it be off the hook if Jeff Bezos died?

Institutions work differently from individuals, and one of the differences is precisely that their obligations are corporate, not that of their employees. Your principle, if consistently applied, would make it impossible to sign a long-term contract with any institution (a government, a corporation, a university, etc.) or hold it accountable for its behavior.

The problem with this is that it makes the criterion institutional continuity, rather than the guilt of individuals, and that as long as there is institutional continuity responsibility lasts forever, i.e. by this criterion the only reason why Mongolia should not be making reparations for the Mongol genocides by this count is that there is no institutional continuity between the Mongol Empire and present-day Mongolia.

[Nachtswalbe]

The new internet cultures like Diamond Age phyles:
https://mobile.twitter.com/AliTheHigh1/ ... 2887142400

[Nachtswalbe]

Yet another issue is independentist nationalism, that which seeks to create a new sovereign state instead of existing ones stronger.

There are certainly stateless nations like the Kurds who generally want their own states, and there are those like Indian Tamils who are generally satisfied with being of the old country.

This issue is further complicated by colonial borders imposed ontop of existing linguistic and ethnic borders, and the claim that even without direct colonization, the influx of modern weapons et. Al. Would redraw borders and help impose languages and identities like how European states centralized and imposed identity and language

[Moose-tache]

Western powers carve the Balkans into contiguous nation-states, making ethnicity and geographical borders match as best they can: "What are you doing? Nation-states are a terrible idea! How can civic institutions be expected to take minority rights seriously? What about exclaves? What about demographic change over time? Boo!"

Western powers conglomerate African and Asian ethnic groups into large states without a clear ethnic identity: "What are you doing? You're ignoring the diversity within these areas! How can people be expected to have faith in or identify with their government? They should each have their own nation-state. Boo!"

[Nachtswalbe]

Western powers carve the Balkans into contiguous nation-states, making ethnicity and geographical borders match as best they can: "What are you doing? Nation-states are a terrible idea! How can civic institutions be expected to take minority rights seriously? What about exclaves? What about demographic change over time? Boo!"

Western powers conglomerate African and Asian ethnic groups into large states without a clear ethnic identity: "What are you doing? You're ignoring the diversity within these areas! How can people be expected to have faith in or identify with their government? They should each have their own nation-state. Boo!"

For the first, are you referring to the Congress of Berlin (not the Berlin Conference) and the subsequent Balkan Wars between Balkan states and the Turks, and between Balkan states?

Also the Balkans states were created through ethnic purges of Turks and Muslim Balkanians

[hwhatting]

Western powers carve the Balkans into contiguous nation-states, making ethnicity and geographical borders match as best they can: "What are you doing? Nation-states are a terrible idea! How can civic institutions be expected to take minority rights seriously? What about exclaves? What about demographic change over time? Boo!"

Western powers conglomerate African and Asian ethnic groups into large states without a clear ethnic identity: "What are you doing? You're ignoring the diversity within these areas! How can people be expected to have faith in or identify with their government? They should each have their own nation-state. Boo!"

You're mixing actions and criticisms from different actors and ages here - what exactly is your point?

[Linguoboy]

Western powers carve the Balkans into contiguous nation-states, making ethnicity and geographical borders match as best they can: "What are you doing? Nation-states are a terrible idea! How can civic institutions be expected to take minority rights seriously? What about exclaves? What about demographic change over time? Boo!"

Western powers conglomerate African and Asian ethnic groups into large states without a clear ethnic identity: "What are you doing? You're ignoring the diversity within these areas! How can people be expected to have faith in or identify with their government? They should each have their own nation-state. Boo!"

You're mixing actions and criticisms from different actors and ages here - what exactly is your point?

Furthermore, what both sets of actions have in common is that they were imposed on these populations by outside actors. Barring a handful of exceptions, nobody asked them what they themselves wanted.

[Nachtswalbe]

Confucian Integralism is a political ideology created by one Jiang Qing, which calls for the state to encompass three bases: sacred, national-historical and popular. Thus his proposed parliament would have a popularly elected legislature, a "national" one for national heroes and religious minorities, and a "Guardian Council" of Confucian scholars with an Emperor on top - kind of like an modernized confucian monarchy.

The House of Ru, like Iran's council, would have the right to overrule 'civilian' politicians.
These sorts of 'Civilization-Integralists' would create governments in line with 'theonational principles', with elected legislatures subordinate to councils which represent the Civilization/Religion

[Travis B.]

Confucian Integralism is a political ideology created by one Jiang Qing, which calls for the state to encompass three bases: sacred, national-historical and popular. Thus his proposed parliament would have a popularly elected legislature, a "national" one for national heroes and religious minorities, and a "Guardian Council" of Confucian scholars with an Emperor on top - kind of like an modernized confucian monarchy.

The House of Ru, like Iran's council, would have the right to overrule 'civilian' politicians.
These sorts of 'Civilization-Integralists' would create governments in line with 'theonational principles', with elected legislatures subordinate to councils which represent the Civilization/Religion

And we know how good Iran's political system has been. I see no reason to believe this would be better.

[Nachtswalbe]

Confucian Integralism is a political ideology created by one Jiang Qing, which calls for the state to encompass three bases: sacred, national-historical and popular. Thus his proposed parliament would have a popularly elected legislature, a "national" one for national heroes and religious minorities, and a "Guardian Council" of Confucian scholars with an Emperor on top - kind of like an modernized confucian monarchy.

The House of Ru, like Iran's council, would have the right to overrule 'civilian' politicians.
These sorts of 'Civilization-Integralists' would create governments in line with 'theonational principles', with elected legislatures subordinate to councils which represent the Civilization/Religion

And we know how good Iran's political system has been. I see no reason to believe this would be better.

Apparently the Catholic Integralists have been stanning him as a fellow theocrat

[Ares Land]

I was very amused to see Charles Stross suggest the constitution of Iran as a viable concept for a socialist republic. His rationale is that it's one example of a revolutionary power that stays vaguely democratic. But he can be weird politically.

(I think it's democratic for a very specific value of 'democratic.' Personally, I find the constitution of Iran is akin to Charles II of Spain family tree.)

[Travis B.]

I was very amused to see Charles Stross suggest the constitution of Iran as a viable concept for a socialist republic. His rationale is that it's one example of a revolutionary power that stays vaguely democratic. But he can be weird politically.

(I think it's democratic for a very specific value of 'democratic.' Personally, I find the constitution of Iran is akin to Charles II of Spain family tree.)

Somehow it seems ironic to promote something which is less democratic than liberal democracy as being more "socialist" than liberal democracy, when properly socialism ought to be more democratic than liberal democracy by extending democracy to control of capital (which is generally authoritarian under liberal democracy aside from in the case of the occasional worker cooperative).

[Ares Land]

I think the idea is more or less tongue in cheek.

It does adress a fair question: how do you make sure your liberal democracy stays democratic?
Personally, I feel there's a problem with not vetting candidates or proposals beforehand. I don't have a good answer to that, though.

[Travis B.]

I think the idea is more or less tongue in cheek.

It does adress a fair question: how do you make sure your liberal democracy stays democratic?
Personally, I feel there's a problem with not vetting candidates or proposals beforehand. I don't have a good answer to that, though.

Vetting candidates, to me, seems like it'd be distinctly anti-democratic because it would ensure control of the political system by an elite which acts as gatekeepers for who may be elected - think what happens in Iran.

I think a better approach would be to specifically write democratic principles into the constitution and make them very hard to change - think requiring a supermajority vote of the population and simultaneous supermajority votes of each of the national legislative bodies and a simultaneous supermajority vote of all federal units before certain parts of the constitution can be changed - and to actually enforce these democratic principles through the legal system, i.e. making it illegal to attempt to introduce laws which violate them.