Russia invades Ukraine

[Moose-tache]

I think the question of when does Putin go and what happens to the Russian economy are pretty moot points.* The question is, what happens in the long term? Form 882 CE to today Russia has spent about ten years total as a functioning democracy. Putin has crippled the courts, the judiciary, the media. What does post-Putin look like other than more Putin? What states have come back from the modern form of illiberalism**, and what model do they offer?

* When will Putin be out? Well, he might live for another thirty years, so anywhere between one day and thirty years; what difference does it make? What sort of economy will Russia have? Extractive with some industry, medium per capita income, same as it ever was, same as Kazakhstan probably. Nothing's going to change that.

** I am referring not to overt dictatorships but to states like Chad, Belarus, etc. who have high-minded democratic constitutions but with executives who have eroded enough checks on their power to rule as autocrats. Several of these have popped up in the last few decades, and none of them has since returned to functioning democracy. Ante-deluvian equivalents like the late Wiemar Republic don't provide encouraging parallels, either.

[Raphael]

** I am referring not to overt dictatorships but to states like Chad, Belarus, etc. who have high-minded democratic constitutions but with executives who have eroded enough checks on their power to rule as autocrats. Several of these have popped up in the last few decades, and none of them has since returned to functioning democracy.

Exactly.

[zompist]

I understand there's no convincing reply to modern pessimism, but I kinda wonder how people can recall the Weimar republic, and presumably the spot of unpleasantness that followed, and not recall the 73 years of democracy afterward.

On Russia in particular, it's reasonable to predict more despotism; but predictions about Russia have an even worse track record than invasions of Russia.

[Ares Land]

I'm myself very uncertain, but very cautiously on the pessimistic side.

Weaning Western Europe off Russian fossil fuel is proving very difficult; the war has an economic impact at an inconvenient time; it's an open secret that Macron, at least (and possibly other Western European leaders) would rather have Ukraine make territorial concessions and let Putin save face.

[Raphael]

Anyway, Kamil Galeev's latest thread

https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1534 ... 20546.html

makes an interesting point:

Ideally Kremlin would extirpate any nonconformity over the USSR. And it did, in the humanities (which explains their current condition). But repressions against the STEM folk were costly, because the STEM folk had to produce stuff, So Kremlin needed to kinda tolerate them

[...]

As a result, by the late USSR the STEM became *the* only oasis for free thinkers and non conformists in the entire country. They were the only ones who were allowed for (some) freedom and nonconformity without the immediate repressions. In humanities it was far worse

For people from beyond the post-USSR it's difficult to grasp the cultural importance of the STEM culture (the only oasis of free thought and non conformity) for the post-Soviet culture in general. Pretty much anything else turned out to be intellectually and culturally futile
When discussing the post-Soviet space, you need to consider this STEM bias in their thinking. This bias exists because mental processes taking place outside of STEM ecosystem can't be really qualified as "thinking"

That bias produces negative externalities. Consider just one. A boy studied only math, physics and engineering in school, then in uni. Then he became an engineer, a manager and finally a CEO. Sounds good, doesn't it? On paper, yes, zero knowledge of humanities didn't hurt him

In reality it's more complicated. An intellectual with zero knowledge of humanities is nearly guaranteed to fall in love with the first theory he becomes acquainted of. That's why all those Soviet (and post-Soviet) STEM folk are such an easy prey for charlatans. Saw it many times

Many Westerners think that Russians are into mysticism. As a general rule, that's wrong. (Smart) Russians don't fall for mysticism that easily as Westerners could imagine. What Russians really fall for easily and enthusiastically is pseudo science

I think I might have found an explanation for certain members of this Board...

[keenir]

I understand there's no convincing reply to modern pessimism, but I kinda wonder how people can recall the Weimar republic, and presumably the spot of unpleasantness that followed, and not recall the 73 years of democracy afterward.

Problem being, first have to get past that spot.

[Ryusenshi]

Finally, it's worth pointing out that Putin is 69 and there have been persistent rumors of poor health, possibly including cancer. Maybe this isn't an issue for him for a few years; but it can also change the calculus of those in a position to act.

I don't believe the rumors about Putin being sick, but indeed, he is getting old.

I can't help but think about Enki Bilal's body of work: one of his recurring themes is the ageing dictator. When a dictator is young... well, dictatorship sucks, but... sometimes, a young dictator sincerely tries to make his country better, and in some respects, may even succeed in the short term, by getting rid of a corrupt government or ramping up industrialization. But an ageing dictator will obsess over keeping his power, engage in counterproductive paranoia, and surround himself with yes-men. This is when things get dangerous.

[zompist]

I can't help but think about Enki Bilal's body of work: one of his recurring themes is the ageing dictator. When a dictator is young... well, dictatorship sucks, but... sometimes, a young dictator sincerely tries to make his country better, and in some respects, may even succeed in the short term, by getting rid of a corrupt government or ramping up industrialization. But an ageing dictator will obsess over keeping his power, engage in counterproductive paranoia, and surround himself with yes-men. This is when things get dangerous.

Bilal isn't too optimistic about these situations. At least some beautiful, inscrutable blue-skinned women will be involved.

Putin is already doing all those things, but the problem with yes-men and corruption is precisely that it creates costly failures, unless you target people who really can't fight back (Chechens, Syrian rebels). And I do think it needs to be a failure for Putin; Macron's idea of letting him save face is pretty terrible.

[hwhatting]

Finally, it's worth pointing out that Putin is 69 and there have been persistent rumors of poor health, possibly including cancer. Maybe this isn't an issue for him for a few years; but it can also change the calculus of those in a position to act.

My Mom is in her seventies, and aside from the fact that she gets tired more often and more easily than she used to, there aren't any clear signs of her age yet - if you'd meet her, you might well guess that she's 20 years younger. Sure, she's certainly a much, much better human being than Putin, but I don't think that that kind of thing has medical effects. My point is, "69" probably doesn't mean what it used to mean anymore - not what it meant when you were growing up or even when I was growing up. In your various aging-related blog posts, you yourself seemed to claim that really serious decay tends to start at around 90 these days. Robert Mugabe stayed in power until he was 93, and he was from an earlier generation than Putin.

Well, you ignored that part: "there have been persistent rumors of poor health, possibly including cancer". Yes, 69 is not near-end-of-life nowadays normally, but the rumours of health issues are persistent, and they have been proposed as one of the reasons why he changed his modus operandi from biting off chunks he can give propaganda reasons for and get away with with only minimal sanctions like with the Georgian ethnic republics, Crimea, and the Donbass, to full-blown invasion - he wanted to annex Ukraine and get into the history books as a "gatherer of Russian lands" as long as he's still able.
That may also be another reason why he doesn't seem to care about the long-term economic consequences (besides that he underestimated the Western reaction and that he probably lacks understanding how a modern economy works and what is needed to keep Russia competitive long-term) - it will be somebody else's problem, to be solved after he dies as glorious conqueror of Ukraine.

[Torco]

Old people are quite able to hold on to power until they're really really old: a good example is the us! of course, no one old person is as central to the government of the us as Putin is to russia. Still, the concept of 'dictatorship' may be misleading here: unlike Franco, Pinochet or Hitler -which seem like better candidates for assassinations resulting in deep regime change- even if Putin drops dead tomorrow, I don't think that's very likely to result in russia becoming a liberal electoral multi-party democracy. For one thing, the last time russia embarked on a project of lets-become-what-western-europe-is, it went horribly. For another, I don't think the oligarch class that resulted from the privatizations would gain a lot by the transition, and they would certainly lose a lot. Same with China, for that matter: sure, Xi is a sort of King, but china was doing sort of the same thing before him, and will probably continue on its current path if he "accidentally" swallowed some polonium. Even Venezuela, another thing called a dictatorship, survived the death of Chavez (which, as far as we know, wasn't a magnicide, but he did die young).

and no, I'm not defending the PSUV or the russian regime by saying they're not, precisely speaking, dictatorships (in the sense of "the government of a dictator such that kill the dictator kill the government")... bad and authoritarian regimes can just have enough institutional staying power to survive magnicide, is my point, I guess.

[MacAnDàil]

Well, sure, after all Elisabeth the Second of England and the First of some other places just died and that didn't remove the unelected (but not authoritarian any more) system in place.

But nothing's perfect. There is, though, better and worse. All three people you mentioned no longer being in power would be an improvement, even if the countries would not become model democracies.

[Ares Land]

Old people are quite able to hold on to power until they're really really old: a good example is the us! of course, no one old person is as central to the government of the us as Putin is to russia. Still, the concept of 'dictatorship' may be misleading here: unlike Franco, Pinochet or Hitler -which seem like better candidates for assassinations resulting in deep regime change- even if Putin drops dead tomorrow, I don't think that's very likely to result in russia becoming a liberal electoral multi-party democracy. For one thing, the last time russia embarked on a project of lets-become-what-western-europe-is, it went horribly. For another, I don't think the oligarch class that resulted from the privatizations would gain a lot by the transition, and they would certainly lose a lot. Same with China, for that matter: sure, Xi is a sort of King, but china was doing sort of the same thing before him, and will probably continue on its current path if he "accidentally" swallowed some polonium. Even Venezuela, another thing called a dictatorship, survived the death of Chavez (which, as far as we know, wasn't a magnicide, but he did die young).

and no, I'm not defending the PSUV or the russian regime by saying they're not, precisely speaking, dictatorships (in the sense of "the government of a dictator such that kill the dictator kill the government")... bad and authoritarian regimes can just have enough institutional staying power to survive magnicide, is my point, I guess.

Oh, hi Torco! It's good to see you around. (Off-topic, but if you ever feel like it, I'd love to see your take on the Chilean referendum...)

There are constant rumors that Putin will die soon or be deposed in a coup or whatever. I don't know what to make of these. I don't think it's unlikely he'll stay around for a decade more. I do agree that Russia wasn't really better before him; Yeltsin was just as bad, if not worse, though -- sadly -- the alcoholism made him more manageable.

[Raphael]

I think the rumors about Putin's impending death or fall are just wishful thinking on behalf of people who don't like him. I don't like him myself, but I don't like wishful thinking, either.

As for the point that from the perspective of the Russian people, Putin is at least better than Yeltsin - well, duh. It would have been extremely difficult to be worse than or even just as bad as Yeltsin. I'm not sure how much he really reduced the hypercapitalism of the Yeltsin years, though. Sure, he took out some of the oligarchs after they had annoyed him in various ways, but then he apparently cut deals with them remaining ones, and left them and their wealth in place. There don't seem to be all that many limitations on capitalism in Russia right now.

And, as great as Putin might have been from the perspective of some people in Russia, I myself don't live in Russia. I live, instead, in one of the countries that Putin might invade next if Ukraine works out well for him, or that he might nuke if he throws a temper tantrum. So my sympathy for him and his supporters is limited.

[Linguoboy]

An analysis, based into a deep dive into sources other than official Russian government figures, which indicates that sanctions are working and the Russian economy is in worse shape than previously reported: https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/22/ru ... -business/. (The article is from July but I missed it when it came out.)

That together with Ukraine's amazing recent successes in winning back territory in the east of the country is giving me renewed hope.

[Raphael]

Putin's latest speech is not good at all.

[Linguoboy]

Putin's latest speech is not good at all.

I am hoping the partial mobilisation backfires, They don't dare call for a full mobilisation yet, because that would meet with mass resistance, but everyone has to know that this is a concrete step in that direction.

ETA: https://www.npr.org/2022/09/21/11242382 ... st-call-up

Tickets for the Moscow-Belgrade flights operated by Air Serbia, the only European carrier besides Turkish Airlines to maintain flights to Russia despite a European Union flight embargo, sold out for the next several days. The price for flights from Moscow to Istanbul or Dubai increased within minutes before jumping again, reaching as high as 9,200 euros ($9,119) for a one-way economy class fare....Some postings [on social media] alleged people already had been turned back from Russia's land border with Georgia and that the website of the state Russian railway company collapsed because too many people were checking for ways out of the country. Social networks in Russian also surged with advice on how to avoid the mobilization or leave the country.

[zompist]

Putin's latest speech is not good at all.

I am hoping the partial mobilisation backfires, They don't dare call for a full mobilisation yet, because that would meet with mass resistance, but everyone has to know that this is a concrete step in that direction.

Kamil Galeev has a great thread on mobilization.

In short: the USSR organized its army for mass mobilization. That meant creating an enormous and expensive system for quickly absorbing them. E.g. there would be incomplete units fully officered, but with few soldiers. Under mobilization they became full units. They still wouldn't be well trained, but it was felt that competent officers would make up for that.

This system hasn't existed for 20 or more years. There are no facilities to handle mass mobilization, no framework of officers. The best officers are in Ukraine now anyway.

And as Galeev says, Russian infrastructure is centered on Moscow. The only place to store and train hundreds of thousands of recruits is Moscow; and because Russian logistics suck, they'd be stuck there a long time, waiting to be sent to Ukraine to die. A huge mob of armed soldiers (or unarmed soldiers who know where the arms are stored) in the capital, angry at the state during a failed war, is a recipe for revolution. That's what happened in 1917.

[Raphael]

ETA: https://www.npr.org/2022/09/21/11242382 ... st-call-up

Tickets for the Moscow-Belgrade flights operated by Air Serbia, the only European carrier besides Turkish Airlines to maintain flights to Russia despite a European Union flight embargo, sold out for the next several days. The price for flights from Moscow to Istanbul or Dubai increased within minutes before jumping again, reaching as high as 9,200 euros ($9,119) for a one-way economy class fare....Some postings [on social media] alleged people already had been turned back from Russia's land border with Georgia and that the website of the state Russian railway company collapsed because too many people were checking for ways out of the country. Social networks in Russian also surged with advice on how to avoid the mobilization or leave the country.

I have very, very mixed feelings about this. The more people unhappy with the current status quo leave Russia, the fewer are left who could try to do something about the current status quo.

Not that doing something about the current status quo would necessarily be a good thing. I don't think it's likely that a violent revolution in a country with thousands of nuclear weapons will lead to any good outcomes, for the country itself or for the world in general.


EDITED TO ADD:

See also this tweet from Bret Devereaux:

https://twitter.com/BretDevereaux/statu ... 9958809600

I am cautious with Kamil's threads. Sometimes he ends up being right, sometimes a bit off, but he's always seeming to tell me what I *want* to hear, which makes me very wary.

That said, a lot of experts expressed doubts about the effectiveness of Russian mobilization.

[Torco]

Well, sure, after all Elisabeth the Second of England and the First of some other places just died and that didn't remove the unelected (but not authoritarian any more) system in place.

But nothing's perfect. There is, though, better and worse. All three people you mentioned no longer being in power would be an improvement, even if the countries would not become model democracies.

Fair... but I don't know, the way westerners speak about magniciding puting or breaking up russia or stuff... I just feel russia is really dangerous. kind of like the us, if it broke up in a sort of catastrophic social systems failure, or if enough political instability comes to happen, I can't shake the feeling that nukes might start flying. I feel for the ukranians getting their country invaded, but... I don't know, man, nukes flying.

Oh, hi Torco! It's good to see you around. (Off-topic, but if you ever feel like it, I'd love to see your take on the Chilean referendum...)

hey! sure, I'll drop some lines =)

[zompist]

Not that doing something about the current status quo would necessarily be a good thing. I don't think it's likely that a violent revolution in a country with thousands of nuclear weapons will lead to any good outcomes, for the country itself or for the world in general.

Getting rid of Putin doesn't mean that someone nice, reasonable, and Western-leading will come to power. One of Galeev's points is that even the 'liberal' opposition is highly Russian nationalist.

But could someone worse come in? Maybe! The ISW reports that Putin's personal thug Ramzan Kadyrov called the recent prisoner exchange "incomprehensible." Note what I said earlier about the importance of keeping your personal thugs happy.

The problem for a worse-than-Putin guy is that taking over does not undo Putin's mistakes. Putin trashed the Russian army, blew up a huge proportion of its modern arms, trashed Russia's reputation, strengthened NATO, strangled his own military production, trashed his ability to play in his own background (e.g. support Armenia), triggered his large neighbor into becoming a formidable military, all the while building an ultra-corrupt regime incapable of telling the truth to leadership, to the people, or to the army. Putting a new thug in charge does not change any of this. If it's an ultra-nationalist thug it's even worse, because it's even less acceptable to tell him bad news.

When people thought that Putin's unhinged rhetoric was backed by the second most powerful military on earth, his rhetoric was frightening. When he can't even keep the peace in his own fake NATO, Central Asia, it's much less so.

Which is not to say he's defeated! Obviously he's keeping the war going in Ukraine out of spite, and there's a lot of Ukrainian territory to recover. Ukraine, unlike Russia, is constrained by the desire not to just kill off its army.

EDITED TO ADD:
See also this tweet from Bret Devereaux:
https://twitter.com/BretDevereaux/statu ... 9958809600

I respect Bret, but I don't think this is one of his finer moments. He doesn't give any reasons why Galeev's account of mobilization would be wrong.

See the ISW's analysis I linked above. Russia is talking about mobilizing 300,000 men— few of whom have any desire to go. You can turn a conscript army into an effective fighting force, but it takes a year or more. Also, for scale, Ukraine's army includes about a million people total— we're not talking numbers that dwarf or overwhelm Ukraine, even if they were immediately available.

Note the tactic of immediately drafting protesters into the army. That's the sort of sick joke totalitarians like... but how does it make a shred of military sense? It's treating your army as a death pit into which you throw the people you hate the most. Gosh, I wonder how hard they'll fight for Mother Russia?