Elections in various countries

[Richard W]

Also, there is no integrity in an ideology that performs attacks against its own militia and legalises it only afterwards.

That's a difference between the integrity of the party and the integrity of the ideology. And I'm not sure how Nazi policy disputes were to be settled when the fuehrerprinzip was not up to the task.

[Ares Land]

Also, there is no integrity in an ideology that performs attacks against its own militia and legalises it only afterwards.

That's a difference between the integrity of the party and the integrity of the ideology. And I'm not sure how Nazi policy disputes were to be settled when the fuehrerprinzip was not up to the task.

Interestingly they were not settled. It looks like Hitler liked having multiple competing institutions and constant bureaucratic infighting; it fit his paranoia very well.
The Nazi regime projected the image of well-oiled machinery but in many cases it really wasn't. (Sadly that wasn't enough to prevent if from being horribly efficient when it came to genocide.)

[rotting bones]

The well-oiled fascist machine is an Anglophone fantasy that's closer to Bentham's Panopticon. Germans always valorized struggle, both on the left (i.e. Marxist class struggle) and the right. Thinkers (including Russians and the French) who tried to adhere to authentically German traditions of thought habitually found the idea of a struggle-free existence distasteful. They often called it things like foreign "abstract" thinking on the right and "mechanical materialism" on the left. They wanted a more lively and dynamic existence for themselves, which they described as "organic" thinking on the right, and "dialectical materialism" on the left.

What Anglophones saw as German "efficiency" was a projection that was experienced very differently by the Germans themselves. Namely, it was existential tension: exerting oneself to the utmost in the struggle for X, where X varied by ideology.

[Travis B.]

The division and infighting within Nazi Germany at least obstructed the German war effort, if anything, e.g. the fact that there were many different cryptanalysis efforts within Nazi Germany that did not really cooperate with one another.

[WeepingElf]

The division and infighting within Nazi Germany at least obstructed the German war effort, if anything, e.g. the fact that there were many different cryptanalysis efforts within Nazi Germany that did not really cooperate with one another.

Yes, there were rivalries between the state bureaucracy and the party bureaucracy, and accordingly between the Wehrmacht (i.e., the regular armed forces) and the SS (i.e., the party militia), which severely impeded coordination and cooperation. Also, racial ideology sometimes got in the way, as with the "Deutsche Physik" (meant as an alternative to "Jewish" modern physics), which AFAIK was part of the reason why the Nazis did not manage to build an atomic bomb.

[rotting bones]

If you count the entire history of European colonialism as one big event, then that event was worse than the crimes of the Nazis.

The Circassian genocide wiped a whole country off the map. This happened in the old world, not the new.

I'd also note, genocide is sadly not a unique property of the Nazis. That's been hard to maintain since the genocides in Cambodia and Rwanda, but it was also practiced by Stalin, by Burma, by Sudan, by the Turks, and by various colonial states.

These are all examples of modern nationalism.

[Raphael]

If you count the entire history of European colonialism as one big event, then that event was worse than the crimes of the Nazis.

The Circassian genocide wiped a whole country off the map. This happened in the old world, not the new.

One of many examples of European colonialism - in this case, that of Russia, which anti-imperialists deny is an empire - that happened in the old world rather than the new.

I'd also note, genocide is sadly not a unique property of the Nazis. That's been hard to maintain since the genocides in Cambodia and Rwanda, but it was also practiced by Stalin, by Burma, by Sudan, by the Turks, and by various colonial states.

These are all examples of modern nationalism.

Stalin? Pol Pot? The Ottoman Empire?

[Travis B.]

If you count the entire history of European colonialism as one big event, then that event was worse than the crimes of the Nazis.

The Circassian genocide wiped a whole country off the map. This happened in the old world, not the new.

One of many examples of European colonialism - in this case, that of Russia, which anti-imperialists deny is an empire - that happened in the old world rather than the new.

The pro-Russian 'anti-imperialists' are utterly insufferable...

I'd also note, genocide is sadly not a unique property of the Nazis. That's been hard to maintain since the genocides in Cambodia and Rwanda, but it was also practiced by Stalin, by Burma, by Sudan, by the Turks, and by various colonial states.

These are all examples of modern nationalism.

Stalin? Pol Pot? The Ottoman Empire?

Stalin took Marxist-Leninism and added nationalism (a.k.a. 'socialism in one state') to it. The Khmer Rouge were just as much Cambodian nationalists as they were ultra-Maoists (they disproportionately killed minorities in Cambodia such as the Vietnamese and Chams). As for the Ottoman Empire, remember that it was the Young Turks, who were nationalists, who in particular targeted the Armenians and Assyrians.

[rotting bones]

One of many examples of European colonialism - in this case, that of Russia, which anti-imperialists deny is an empire - that happened in the old world rather than the new.

It was very extreme. The Chechen genocide was almost but not quite that bad.

I think the multipolarites don't think modern Russia is as bad as Tsarism?

Stalin? Pol Pot? The Ottoman Empire?

Socialism in one country. Khmer nationalism. Right as nationalist sentiment was flourishing, followed by the creation of modern Turkey. In histories of the period, they say it was a modern phenomenon.

[Travis B.]

I think the multipolarites don't think modern Russia is as bad as Tsarism?

The 'multipolarites' are tankies who have forgotten that Russia is no longer big-C Communist.

[Raphael]

Stalin took Marxist-Leninism and added nationalism (a.k.a. 'socialism in one state') to it. The Khmer Rouge were just as much Cambodian nationalists as they were ultra-Maoists (they disproportionately killed minorities in Cambodia such as the Vietnamese and Chams). As for the Ottoman Empire, remember that it was the Young Turks, who were nationalists, who in particular targeted the Armenians and Assyrians.

Stalin? Pol Pot? The Ottoman Empire?

Socialism in one country. Khmer nationalism. Right as nationalist sentiment was flourishing, followed by the creation of modern Turkey. In histories of the period, they say it was a modern phenomenon.

Fair enough. Then again, the Left throughout the Global South seems to have long been tinged with various local nationalisms - "We need to throw out those rich Western foreigners who oppress and exploit us all!" And I'm not saying that's always a bad thing. It might well have allowed some left-wing movements to be a lot more politically successful than they would otherwise have been.

On the whole, I'm skeptical about the whole idea that you can draw a clear line between "modern nationalism" and "not modern nationalism". There seems to be consensus among many people that nationalism is a product of the 18th and 19th centuries, and therefore, modernity. But it seems to be mainly one version of cultural group solidarity, which might well be the oldest force in human politics. Shakespeare wrote "This royal throne of kings, this scepter’d isle,[...]" in the late 16th century. Machiavelli wrote the last part of The Prince, with its clear appeal to Italian national feelings, in the early 16th century.

[Travis B.]

Stalin took Marxist-Leninism and added nationalism (a.k.a. 'socialism in one state') to it. The Khmer Rouge were just as much Cambodian nationalists as they were ultra-Maoists (they disproportionately killed minorities in Cambodia such as the Vietnamese and Chams). As for the Ottoman Empire, remember that it was the Young Turks, who were nationalists, who in particular targeted the Armenians and Assyrians.

Stalin? Pol Pot? The Ottoman Empire?

Socialism in one country. Khmer nationalism. Right as nationalist sentiment was flourishing, followed by the creation of modern Turkey. In histories of the period, they say it was a modern phenomenon.

Fair enough. Then again, the Left throughout the Global South seems to have long been tinged with various local nationalisms - "We need to throw out those rich Western foreigners who oppress and exploit us all!" And I'm not saying that's always a bad thing. It might well have allowed some left-wing movements to be a lot more politically successful than they would otherwise have been.

On the whole, I'm skeptical about the whole idea that you can draw a clear line between "modern nationalism" and "not modern nationalism". There seems to be consensus among many people that nationalism is a product of the 18th and 19th centuries, and therefore, modernity. But it seems to be mainly one version of cultural group solidarity, which might well be the oldest force in human politics. Shakespeare wrote "This royal throne of kings, this scepter’d isle,[...]" in the late 16th century. Machiavelli wrote the last part of The Prince, with its clear appeal to Italian national feelings, in the early 16th century.

The key thing which makes nationalism nationalism is seeking a nation-state for a broad 'nation' as defined in one fashion or another (e.g. an ethnicity). Nationalism was only starting to show up during the Early Modern period, and it was quite some time before people really commonly thought in nationalist terms; before then, they thought in terms like loyalty to a sovereign, religion, local identity, or so on. And it should be emphasized that earlier adherence to local identities was different from modern nationalism, as in very many cases people sought rights within a greater realm (e.g. fueros within the Spanish Empire) for their locale rather than the establishment of a nation-state per se.

[Raphael]

This reminds me: Anyone know of any good books about the whole political development and interactions between Vietnam, Cambodia, China, the Soviet Union, and the USA (Nixon, Ford, and Carter Administrations) in the mid-to-late 1970s, and the various wars and diplomatic maneuvers all that involved?

[Raphael]

Travis: Hm. I'm not really convinced. I suspect that this narrative over-emphasizes some points and leaves out others. Aren't there sentiments that might be described as at least patriotic in the Tale of Sinuhe?

[Travis B.]

Travis: Hm. I'm not really convinced. I suspect that this narrative over-emphasizes some points and leaves out others. Aren't there sentiments that might be described as at least patriotic in the Tale of Sinuhe?

Patriotism for a local identity in the sense you mention is distinct from nationalism in the sense of seeking a nation-state for a nation, and well predates it. There appears to be nothing in the Tale of Sinuhe which is promoting the idea of a nation-state for Egyptians as a nation per se, even though it definitely has patriotic sentiments to it.

[zompist]

Travis: Hm. I'm not really convinced. I suspect that this narrative over-emphasizes some points and leaves out others. Aren't there sentiments that might be described as at least patriotic in the Tale of Sinuhe?

Patriotism for a local identity in the sense you mention is distinct from nationalism in the sense of seeking a nation-state for a nation, and well predates it. There appears to be nothing in the Tale of Sinuhe which is promoting the idea of a nation-state for Egyptians as a nation per se, even though it definitely has patriotic sentiments to it.

Nation-states are relatively new; to see this you only have to look at European history before about 1700. Countries were almost never units that were mostly one ethnic group, including all the territory of that ethnic group, and defined themselves as such, except accidentally. Politics was generally driven by dynastic disputes, and dynasties didn't care if they ruled a dozen ethnic groups (nor did those ethnic groups care much). If you wanted to rebel, you'd often do so in the name of religion rather than ethnicity.

Empires are generally explicitly multinational-- there may be a privileged ethnic group (e.g. Germans in Austria) but an empire is generally happy to let just about anyone work for it, create art for it, and above all fight for it. The USSR isn't exactly a good example of ethnic nationalism-- it had an ideology of multinational cooperation, and after all Stalin wasn't even Russian. It targeted certain ethnicities because of general paranoia and the need to manufacture a steady stream of domestic enemies.

There could certainly be ethnic feelings-- e.g. Romans were proud of being Roman. But note that the Romans gradually extended citizenship to more and more groups, eventually (211 CE) including all non-slave males. You could easily be a proud Roman citizen without ever having visited Rome or speaking Latin.

The Chinese empire arguably did have a Han Chinese identity, though ultimately I think it was more of an empire than a nation-state. It was dedicated to Chines culture rather than Chinese ethnicity-- admittedly not a huge difference, though I'd suggest that the modern US is much the same.

History is long, and certain ancient states certainly were more ethnically homogenous. Due to geography, Egypt was more so than, say, Mesopotamia. But the patriotism of Sinuhe is about lifestyle, not ethnicity. The Egyptians preferred what they considered the more comfortable culture of Egypt. They were unable or unwilling to prevent significant immigration of Libyans, Nubians, and Canaanites. Lower Mesopotamia, by contrast, retained its overall culture and identity through two complete switches in language (and presumably dominant ethnicity)-- Sumerian to Akkadian to Aramaic.

Genocide can be driven by modern nationalism, but often isn't. It was common in premodern times to destroy a besieged city and enslave the residents-- the Romans did it to Carthage and Corinth; the Mongols did it to any number of Middle Eastern/Central Asian cities. They didn't need nation-state ideology to do this, it just seems that long sieges enrage and embitter the besiegers.

[Travis B.]

Travis: Hm. I'm not really convinced. I suspect that this narrative over-emphasizes some points and leaves out others. Aren't there sentiments that might be described as at least patriotic in the Tale of Sinuhe?

Patriotism for a local identity in the sense you mention is distinct from nationalism in the sense of seeking a nation-state for a nation, and well predates it. There appears to be nothing in the Tale of Sinuhe which is promoting the idea of a nation-state for Egyptians as a nation per se, even though it definitely has patriotic sentiments to it.

Nation-states are relatively new; to see this you only have to look at European history before about 1700. Countries were almost never units that were mostly one ethnic group, including all the territory of that ethnic group, and defined themselves as such, except accidentally. Politics was generally driven by dynastic disputes, and dynasties didn't care if they ruled a dozen ethnic groups (nor did those ethnic groups care much). If you wanted to rebel, you'd often do so in the name of religion rather than ethnicity.

Empires are generally explicitly multinational-- there may be a privileged ethnic group (e.g. Germans in Austria) but an empire is generally happy to let just about anyone work for it, create art for it, and above all fight for it. The USSR isn't exactly a good example of ethnic nationalism-- it had an ideology of multinational cooperation, and after all Stalin wasn't even Russian. It targeted certain ethnicities because of general paranoia and the need to manufacture a steady stream of domestic enemies.

There could certainly be ethnic feelings-- e.g. Romans were proud of being Roman. But note that the Romans gradually extended citizenship to more and more groups, eventually (211 CE) including all non-slave males. You could easily be a proud Roman citizen without ever having visited Rome or speaking Latin.

The Chinese empire arguably did have a Han Chinese identity, though ultimately I think it was more of an empire than a nation-state. It was dedicated to Chines culture rather than Chinese ethnicity-- admittedly not a huge difference, though I'd suggest that the modern US is much the same.

History is long, and certain ancient states certainly were more ethnically homogenous. Due to geography, Egypt was more so than, say, Mesopotamia. But the patriotism of Sinuhe is about lifestyle, not ethnicity. The Egyptians preferred what they considered the more comfortable culture of Egypt. They were unable or unwilling to prevent significant immigration of Libyans, Nubians, and Canaanites. Lower Mesopotamia, by contrast, retained its overall culture and identity through two complete switches in language (and presumably dominant ethnicity)-- Sumerian to Akkadian to Aramaic.

Genocide can be driven by modern nationalism, but often isn't. It was common in premodern times to destroy a besieged city and enslave the residents-- the Romans did it to Carthage and Corinth; the Mongols did it to any number of Middle Eastern/Central Asian cities. They didn't need nation-state ideology to do this, it just seems that long sieges enrage and embitter the besiegers.

That basically sums up how I understand things myself; e.g. the nationalism of Stalinism was not an ethnic nationalism.

[Raphael]

Nation-states are relatively new; to see this you only have to look at European history before about 1700. Countries were almost never units that were mostly one ethnic group, including all the territory of that ethnic group, and defined themselves as such, except accidentally. Politics was generally driven by dynastic disputes, and dynasties didn't care if they ruled a dozen ethnic groups (nor did those ethnic groups care much). If you wanted to rebel, you'd often do so in the name of religion rather than ethnicity.

Your description of Europe before 1700 holds true for the Holy Roman Empire - although it was mostly German-speaking, it was still, to some extent, multiethnic, and its individual component states were largely about regional and local identities - but I'm less sure about some other parts of Europe. France, England, Scotland, Sweden, and Denmark all seem to have been very much about an ethnically-defined national group centuries before the standard narrative tells us modern nationalism got going. Yes, they never managed it to get complete identity between their political borders and their cultural or linguistic borders, but then again, I don't think anyone managed that, even later. Yes, they didn't have the administrative machinery of the modern state, but I don't think support for that is a core component of even modern nationalism - one of the most viciously nationalist movements of our time, the MAGA movement, is very much opposed to large parts of the administrative machinery of its own state.

As for rebelling in the name of religion rather than ethnicity, true enough, but then again, religion was often tied up with ethnicity. Not too long after the Reformation started, some places had built Protestantism solidly into their national identity, and others had done that with Catholicism.

Empires are generally explicitly multinational-- there may be a privileged ethnic group (e.g. Germans in Austria) but an empire is generally happy to let just about anyone work for it, create art for it, and above all fight for it.

True, but the same could be said about most of the European colonial empires that existed at the height of modern European nationalism.

Genocide can be driven by modern nationalism, but often isn't. It was common in premodern times to destroy a besieged city and enslave the residents-- the Romans did it to Carthage and Corinth; the Mongols did it to any number of Middle Eastern/Central Asian cities. They didn't need nation-state ideology to do this, it just seems that long sieges enrage and embitter the besiegers.

Not sure about the "enrage and embitter the besiegers" part. Might be an example of the idea that people generally won't do horrible things to other people unless they're especially angry or frustrated. Which I think is an overly idealistic idea belied by much of humanity's past and present.

[Travis B.]

Nation-states are relatively new; to see this you only have to look at European history before about 1700. Countries were almost never units that were mostly one ethnic group, including all the territory of that ethnic group, and defined themselves as such, except accidentally. Politics was generally driven by dynastic disputes, and dynasties didn't care if they ruled a dozen ethnic groups (nor did those ethnic groups care much). If you wanted to rebel, you'd often do so in the name of religion rather than ethnicity.

Your description of Europe before 1700 holds true for the Holy Roman Empire - although it was mostly German-speaking, it was still, to some extent, multiethnic, and its individual component states were largely about regional and local identities - but I'm less sure about some other parts of Europe. France, England, Scotland, Sweden, and Denmark all seem to have been very much about an ethnically-defined national group centuries before the standard narrative tells us modern nationalism got going. Yes, they never managed it to get complete identity between their political borders and their cultural or linguistic borders, but then again, I don't think anyone managed that, even later. Yes, they didn't have the administrative machinery of the modern state, but I don't think support for that is a core component of even modern nationalism - one of the most viciously nationalist movements of our time, the MAGA movement, is very much opposed to large parts of the administrative machinery of its own state.

As for rebelling in the name of religion rather than ethnicity, true enough, but then again, religion was often tied up with ethnicity. Not too long after the Reformation started, some places had built Protestantism solidly into their national identity, and others had done that with Catholicism.

As for France, England, Scotland, Sweden, and Denmark-Norway, under the ancien regime France was internally split up into many local identities (the notion of a homogeneously French state would come later with the French Revolution), England was a multiethnic state including the English, the Welsh, and the Cornish, Scotland was a multiethnic state including Scots-speaking lowlanders and Scots Gaelic-speaking highlanders, Sweden was a multiethnic empire including Swedes, Finns, Sami, Estonians, and Germans, and Denmark-Norway was a multiethnic state including Danes, Norwegians, Germans, Frisians, Icelanders, and the Faroese.

[Raphael]

As for France, England, Scotland, Sweden, and Denmark-Norway, under the ancien regime France was internally split up into many local identities (the notion of a homogeneously French state would come later with the French Revolution),

It wasn't homogeneous, but I think it already had a distinct French identity. Perhaps we should hire a psychic to ask Jeanne d'Arc for her take on the matter?

England was a multiethnic state including the English, the Welsh, and the Cornish,

The same was true during the later heyday of "modern" nationalism. The English were still the main group around whose self-image the national identity was built.

Scotland was a multiethnic state including Scots-speaking lowlanders and Scots Gaelic-speaking highlanders,

The same was true during the later heyday of "modern" nationalism.

Sweden was a multiethnic empire including Swedes, Finns, Sami, Estonians, and Germans,

The same was true during the later heyday of "modern" nationalism. The Swedes were still the main group around whose self-image the national identity was built.

and Denmark-Norway was a multiethnic state including Danes, Norwegians, Germans, Frisians, Icelanders, and the Faroese.

The same was true during the later heyday of "modern" nationalism. The Danes were still the main group around whose self-image the national identity was built.