Zompist Bboard Again

The key difference between those and modern nationalism was that under modern nationalism there was not merely a dominant ethnicity -- states have had dominant ethnicities almost forever -- but rather there was the idea of nation-states for nations. Take the Nordic countries for instance -- in 1700 Sweden and Denmark-Norway were not nation-states, and modern nationalism would come into play during the 1800's with the emergence of different nationalisms such as Norwegian, Finnish, and Icelandic nationalism. In 1700 these really did not exist.

Scotland does include Scots- and Gaelic-speakers. There were also Norn- and the oft-forgotten Romani-speakers. They did have a national identity and it was in the name thereof that they fought the Wars of Independence (1296-1357). Note the Declaration of Arbroath says "for, as long as but a hundred of us remain alive, never will we on any conditions be brought under English rule." It was however taken from a Roman source, Bellum Catilinae by Sallust. Religion only came into the picture as the external authority to which they appealed.

Travis B. wrote: ↑Thu Oct 02, 2025 9:43 am The key difference between those and modern nationalism was that under modern nationalism there was not merely a dominant ethnicity -- states have had dominant ethnicities almost forever -- but rather there was the idea of nation-states for nations. Take the Nordic countries for instance -- in 1700 Sweden and Denmark-Norway were not nation-states, and modern nationalism would come into play during the 1800's with the emergence of different nationalisms such as Norwegian, Finnish, and Icelandic nationalism. In 1700 these really did not exist.

A relatively minor adjustment, IMO. I'd say the continuity with ancient attitudes of hostility when people are confronted with those who speak a different language and have a different culture is bigger than the small modifications that turned those ancient attitudes into modern nationalism.

Raphael wrote: ↑Thu Oct 02, 2025 9:27 am

Travis B. wrote: ↑Thu Oct 02, 2025 9:07 am

As for France, England, Scotland, Sweden, and Denmark-Norway, under the ancien regime France was internally split up into many local identities (the notion of a homogeneously French state would come later with the French Revolution),

It wasn't homogeneous, but I think it already had a distinct French identity. Perhaps we should hire a psychic to ask Jeanne d'Arc for her take on the matter?

It's an interesting question. In terms of government, the Ancien Régime was a complex beast, in that different regions had different legal systems (sometimes very different) and taxation (in ways that don't map up neatly to the traditional provinces). Not to mention language and culture.

There was certainly a French identity though. Except in some place where there weren't; I don't think it was very strong in Brittany (which still has a strong identity of its own.) But it doesn't correspond neatly to linguistic / cultural area. Dunkerque was culturally a Flemish town and spoke a dialect of Dutch; they still felt that they were loyal subjects of the king.
An interesting question is the distinction between 'being French' (which is more of a modern notion) and 'being a subject of the king of France' (probably closer to how people felt?)
There are lots of edge cases that could be explored. E.g. what about Avignon, part of the Papal states, but surrounded by the kingdom of France and not otherwise very different from its neighbours?

Obviously our post-revolution elites felt that national sentiment was lacking, as it was hammered in, not through subtly (sometimes with entertaining fictions such as nos ancêtres les Gaulois), up to WWI and beyond.

As for Joan of Arc; there was a national identity, which was a factor in the Hundred Years' War, but it was likely kind of variable. A lot of it possibly came down to individual loyalties, say to the king of France.

(An interesting bit of medieval history; the province of Dauphiné, before being sold to the kings of France, was part of the Holy Roman Empire. But the people of Dauphiné used to French courts for justice, despite not technically being part of France.)

Getting back to nationalism; I'd say until the modern era the bloodiest conflicts in France were either religious or dynastic disputes. Even the Hundred Years' War -- the bloodiest part was the civil war between Armagnacs and Bourguignons, which were (simplifying things a bit) competing factions within the French court.

Thank you, interesting!

Raphael wrote: ↑Thu Oct 02, 2025 8:02 am France, England, Scotland, Sweden, and Denmark all seem to have been very much about an ethnically-defined national group centuries before the standard narrative tells us modern nationalism got going. Yes, they never managed it to get complete identity between their political borders and their cultural or linguistic borders, but then again, I don't think anyone managed that, even later.

Except for France, most of these were smaller countries on the margins of Europe. Also, I wouldn't read modern ethnic identities back a thousand years. E.g. before 900 the "English" were divided into multiple states much like the Germans later were, and from 1066 to 1200 or longer their rulers, if they thought of themselves as anything at all, probably thought they were French.

Medieval France looks on the map a lot more like modern France than most of Europe, but did it feel like that at the time? Besides Brittany, and the Basque country, there was a big division between Old French and Provençal. It may be significant that Joan of Arc came from northern France and all of her battles were there.

Plus, even though you have national-level things like kings and wars, the vast majority of the population probably didn't care about "France" or "England". There was no universal education to make them care, and armies were small, so most peasants didn't serve in them. Maybe there was some feeling for the king, but probably more for the local lord. Of course if you were conquered by a "foreign" army that would suck, but even having "your own" army come through would be traumatic. And in medieval times the king's language probably sounded weird not terribly far from his capital.

zompist wrote: ↑Fri Oct 03, 2025 5:37 am
Medieval France looks on the map a lot more like modern France than most of Europe, but did it feel like that at the time? Besides Brittany, and the Basque country, there was a big division between Old French and Provençal. It may be significant that Joan of Arc came from northern France and all of her battles were there.

It's an interesting point, and it varies by province. It's worth noting it's not just language either. Southern France had a very different legal system, it was also more urbanized, I think more literate and prosperous, and more connected to Mediterranean powers.
Travel is also a factor: going to Provence from Paris was an incredibly long and possibly dangerous journey. Stagecoaches made the journey easier, but didn't appear until the 18th century I think.

Provence was independant at the time. I think it belonged to the kings of Naples (who were closely related to the French royal family.. but then again, so were the English kings). It's doubtful the people felt French; maybe more so after the 15th century after Provence went to France. That was, by the way, entirely for dynastic regions. (Oversimplifying a bit, the king of France was the closest suitable relative to the last count.)
Languedoc felt very possibly more French, so to speak; it was in fact part of the crown lands. The state of affairs was a result of Albigensian crusades. Interestingly, that conflict can be read as the kings of France asserting control over the province but it had to be framed as a religious question.
I don't know about Aquitaine, tbh. Legally it was French; it just so happened that the duke was also king of England.

I think the question is best answered by seeing nation formation as a gradual process -- of increasing homogenization and consolidation of the French state, continuing up to the Revolution and beyond.
The process was well under way by the time of Joan of Arc; Joan herself being a sign of it, but the process would keep going for centuries after.

zompist wrote: ↑Fri Oct 03, 2025 5:37 am Plus, even though you have national-level things like kings and wars, the vast majority of the population probably didn't care about "France" or "England". There was no universal education to make them care, and armies were small, so most peasants didn't serve in them. Maybe there was some feeling for the king, but probably more for the local lord. Of course if you were conquered by a "foreign" army that would suck, but even having "your own" army come through would be traumatic. And in medieval times the king's language probably sounded weird not terribly far from his capital.

I have a dry but fascinating book called Montaillou, village occitan de 1294 à 1324. You get a pretty good idea of what life was for the ordinary people. Important characters include the local bishop and the inquisition; kings don't really register.

Another book by the same author is Le Carnaval de Romans; both later in time (1579-1580) and closer to royal power. The key figures are again, all local elites. The queen does show up at one point to settle a dispute (it's probably telling that she's unable to do so.)

How Ares Land puts things here is essentially how I understand them myself.

At first I thought about posting this in the "What are you reading..." thread, but it might lead to a political discussion, so I put it here instead.

I'm currently thinking about starting to read Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, which zompist reviewed a bit over a month ago: https://zompist.wordpress.com/2025/08/2 ... ions-fail/

While preparing to buy the book, I saw that it's been translated into German, as Warum Nationen scheitern. I usually don't read German translations of English books, but out of curiosity, I looked a bit at the free sample for the translation on my online store's website. Turns out the authors wrote an additional preface specifically for the German translation.

And in that preface they talk about the political situation in Europe. They talk about how much the European Union is in danger, and how important it is to preserve the European Union because of the peace and prosperity it has brought to (large parts of) Europe.

Sigh. Whenever I hear or see that particular talking point in favor of the EU, I have to exercise a lot of self-control to keep myself from starting to sympathize with the likes of Nigel Farage. It seems clear to me that the main reason why large parts of Europe have been fairly peaceful and stable after 1945 is that, during the First Cold War, within each of the two main blocs, war wasn't possible because everyone was militarily allied with everyone else, and between the two main blocs, war wasn't possible because it would have meant the end of the world. And once the First Cold War was over, people had simply gotten used to living together peacefully.

That idea explains the long period of relative peace and stability in Europe a lot better than the idea that an organization whose standard response to people doing things it doesn't want them to do is to write sternly worded letters has somehow prevented warmongers from waging war.

And yes, the fact that Acemoglu and Robinson believe what they believe on that matter makes it more difficult for me to take them seriously as scholars.

Raphael wrote: ↑Sat Oct 04, 2025 11:43 am They talk about how much the European Union is in danger, and how important it is to preserve the European Union because of the peace and prosperity it has brought to (large parts of) Europe.

To clarify, are you arguing against both ‘peace and prosperity’, or just with the ‘peace’ bit?

bradrn wrote: ↑Sat Oct 04, 2025 11:57 am

Raphael wrote: ↑Sat Oct 04, 2025 11:43 am They talk about how much the European Union is in danger, and how important it is to preserve the European Union because of the peace and prosperity it has brought to (large parts of) Europe.

To clarify, are you arguing against both ‘peace and prosperity’, or just with the ‘peace’ bit?

I'm arguing against the idea that peace was the achievement of the European Union. Prosperity might have been, although I'll note that for most of the Trente Glorieuses, what later became the EU was in its infancy.

Raphael wrote: ↑Sat Oct 04, 2025 12:04 pm

bradrn wrote: ↑Sat Oct 04, 2025 11:57 am

Raphael wrote: ↑Sat Oct 04, 2025 11:43 am They talk about how much the European Union is in danger, and how important it is to preserve the European Union because of the peace and prosperity it has brought to (large parts of) Europe.

To clarify, are you arguing against both ‘peace and prosperity’, or just with the ‘peace’ bit?

I'm arguing against the idea that peace was the achievement of the European Union. Prosperity might have been, although I'll note that for most of the Trente Glorieuses, what later became the EU was in its infancy.

So in your view, are there any achievements which can definitely be ascribed to the EU?

bradrn wrote: ↑Sat Oct 04, 2025 12:07 pm
So in your view, are there any achievements which can definitely be ascribed to the EU?

Easier trade, easier travel, all kinds of everyday conveniences.

Raphael wrote: ↑Sat Oct 04, 2025 11:43 am [Acemoglu and Robinson] talk about the political situation in Europe. They talk about how much the European Union is in danger, and how important it is to preserve the European Union because of the peace and prosperity it has brought to (large parts of) Europe.

Sigh. Whenever I hear or see that particular talking point in favor of the EU, I have to exercise a lot of self-control to keep myself from starting to sympathize with the likes of Nigel Farage. It seems clear to me that the main reason why large parts of Europe have been fairly peaceful and stable after 1945 is that, during the First Cold War, within each of the two main blocs, war wasn't possible because everyone was militarily allied with everyone else, and between the two main blocs, war wasn't possible because it would have meant the end of the world. And once the First Cold War was over, people had simply gotten used to living together peacefully.

That idea explains the long period of relative peace and stability in Europe a lot better than the idea that an organization whose standard response to people doing things it doesn't want them to do is to write sternly worded letters has somehow prevented warmongers from waging war.

Of course I haven't read that preface, so I'm not defending their analysis. I think you're not giving the EU+NATO enough credit though. (I don't know if they're talking about both at once, but I think we have to. Until Trump, Europe was both covered by a powerful security umbrella, and felt it didn't need one of its own.

Europe had to deal with two major threats: revanchism from Germany, and invasion from the USSR. If your feeling is "well of course Germany wasn't going to go Nazi again", I'd say you're taking a lot of difficult and contingent events for granted. The idea that Germany losing a war would only create grievances for the next one was hardly far-fetched; it was what happened between WWI and WWII. A lot of things had to go right to eliminate that possibility: American aid, an alliance vs. the USSR, credible denazification, a credible commitment to democracy on the part of Germany. The conventional wisdom is that early economic integration (e.g. the European Coal and Steel Community) was an important part of this constellation of events, though certainly not the whole of it.

As for invasion, the key period is not the end of WWII but the end of the Cold War. The EU and NATO absorbed not only most of the former Soviet satellites, but actual former Soviet republics. A future historian is probably going to comment that this was a bold move, and that it's astonishing that it was done without violence. Again, there is a constellation of factors which allowed it, but a part of it is surely that the EU existed as a now economic/political bloc that could take them in.

Minor conflicts aren't as dramatic, but e.g. the end of the Irish "troubles" is in part due to the fact that Ireland and the UK were now in the same supernational bloc.

"the end of the world", this has little to do with the EU, but I think you're forgetting how close we came, multiple times. Europe— and much of the US— may have viewed nuclear war as unthinkable. But, to be blunt, a lot of scientists and military were highly paid to think about the unthinkable, here and in the USSR. Both sides, of course, thought that a nuclear response was necessary if the other side started it.

And as for people getting "used to living together peacefully"... you know more history than that. By 1914, Europe had been quite stable for a couple generations, and without a world war for a century. Economies were highly interconnected. Yet it started a World War anyway. Modern times offers plenty of other examples of conflicts starting up after decades of peace.

Raphael wrote: ↑Sat Oct 04, 2025 12:37 pm

bradrn wrote: ↑Sat Oct 04, 2025 12:07 pm
So in your view, are there any achievements which can definitely be ascribed to the EU?

Easier trade, easier travel, all kinds of everyday conveniences.

Such things add up, prosperity wise. For obvious reasons, a lot of work has gone in to the effect of the EU on the UK economy, and I think the consensus is somewhere around 4% of GDP is “missing”¹ because of Brexit, because of all the barriers to traiding with the countries right next door. Although it is worth noting I'm biased, because Britain is rather polarised on Brexit, between “I told you so” and “MUST BREXIT MORE until a utopia magically appears”⁴

¹ The datum I remember being floated around, was that the £22 billion² black hole⁴ Labour highly publicised back in 2024 was roughly equivalent to cost of Brexit * tax revenue as % of the economy, which implies a Brexit cost of ~£60 billion
² Short count billion, i.e. a Milliard³
³ Which is an amazing sounding word. The long count should be standard everywhere
⁴ Partly a true black hole, partly the cost of additional pay increases for public sector workers because of strikes
⁵ Okay, I mat be being slightly unfair here

zompist wrote: ↑Sat Oct 04, 2025 3:53 pm Of course I haven't read that preface, so I'm not defending their analysis. I think you're not giving the EU+NATO enough credit though. (I don't know if they're talking about both at once, but I think we have to. Until Trump, Europe was both covered by a powerful security umbrella, and felt it didn't need one of its own.

The British and French nuclear deterrents being of course to deter one another? I can believe their being feeble because of an inconsistent feeling that the American umbrella could be relied upon.

Until Trump, the likeliest prospect of a war within NATO was Greece v. Turkey. The prospect of EU membership has been dangled out to Turkey; it may have been an effective argument for Leave's victory. The dangling did at least theoretically give Turks additional opportunities to immigrate to Britain, though they were combatted by UK Immigration guidelines.

zompist wrote: ↑Sat Oct 04, 2025 3:53 pm Europe had to deal with two major threats: revanchism from Germany, and invasion from the USSR. If your feeling is "well of course Germany wasn't going to go Nazi again", I'd say you're taking a lot of difficult and contingent events for granted. The idea that Germany losing a war would only create grievances for the next one was hardly far-fetched; it was what happened between WWI and WWII. A lot of things had to go right to eliminate that possibility: American aid, an alliance vs. the USSR, credible denazification, a credible commitment to democracy on the part of Germany. The conventional wisdom is that early economic integration (e.g. the European Coal and Steel Community) was an important part of this constellation of events, though certainly not the whole of it.

Who found the East German commitment to democracy credible?

West Germany has been blamed for the wars that broke out in Yugoslavia.

zompist wrote: ↑Sat Oct 04, 2025 3:53 pm As for invasion, the key period is not the end of WWII but the end of the Cold War. The EU and NATO absorbed not only most of the former Soviet satellites, but actual former Soviet republics. A future historian is probably going to comment that this was a bold move, and that it's astonishing that it was done without violence.

Russia v. Ukraine seems fairly violent.

Richard W wrote: ↑Sat Oct 04, 2025 8:07 pm Who found the East German commitment to democracy credible?

Er, what? It was West Germany that had to show its allies that it was reformed. East Germany was not one of those allies.

West Germany has been blamed for the wars that broke out in Yugoslavia.

That seems a stretch. Why would it be to blame, more than any other state in Europe?

zompist wrote: ↑Sat Oct 04, 2025 3:53 pm As for invasion, the key period is not the end of WWII but the end of the Cold War. The EU and NATO absorbed not only most of the former Soviet satellites, but actual former Soviet republics. A future historian is probably going to comment that this was a bold move, and that it's astonishing that it was done without violence.

Russia v. Ukraine seems fairly violent.

Ukraine is in neither the EU nor NATO.

zompist wrote: ↑Sat Oct 04, 2025 8:13 pm

Richard W wrote: ↑Sat Oct 04, 2025 8:07 pm

zompist wrote: ↑Sat Oct 04, 2025 3:53 pm As for invasion, the key period is not the end of WWII but the end of the Cold War. The EU and NATO absorbed not only most of the former Soviet satellites, but actual former Soviet republics. A future historian is probably going to comment that this was a bold move, and that it's astonishing that it was done without violence.

Russia v. Ukraine seems fairly violent.

Ukraine is in neither the EU nor NATO.

So what is remarkable is that only a small amount of violence was required to keep a territory out? Moldova is the example. I'm assuming no violence was required for Lithuania, where there is an issue of now stateless ethnic Russians.

zompist wrote: ↑Sat Oct 04, 2025 3:53 pm Of course I haven't read that preface, so I'm not defending their analysis. I think you're not giving the EU+NATO enough credit though. (I don't know if they're talking about both at once, but I think we have to. Until Trump, Europe was both covered by a powerful security umbrella, and felt it didn't need one of its own.

I believe it was the UK's membership of NATO that dissuaded Boris Johnson from at least planning a military raid on the continent to secure COVID-19 vaccines. The British military were aghast at the concept.

Richard W wrote: ↑Sat Oct 04, 2025 9:00 pm

zompist wrote: ↑Sat Oct 04, 2025 8:13 pm

Richard W wrote: ↑Sat Oct 04, 2025 8:07 pm
Russia v. Ukraine seems fairly violent.

Ukraine is in neither the EU nor NATO.

So what is remarkable is that only a small amount of violence was required to keep a territory out? Moldova is the example. I'm assuming no violence was required for Lithuania, where there is an issue of now stateless ethnic Russians.

I don't understand your objection. Russia has not attacked any NATO nations; Russia has attacked non-NATO nations. Are you wishing there were more Russian attacks, or less?