Con-military question: would an all-mustang officers' corps be plausible?

[Raphael]

I have a question about how to run my main conculture's military, and since I have no military experience myself, I have no idea how to answer the question.

In modern armed forces on Earth, it's generally the norm to have two completely, or almost completely, separate career tracks for officers and enlisted ranks - you can join the military as an enlisted recruit, or you can apply for officers' training and, if you get accepted and successfully complete officers' training, become a second lieutenant or whatever the equivalent rank in your service is right after completing training.

Apparently, this dates back to the European wars of the middle ages and early modern ages, when men who had been born into the nobility usually served as officers and men who had been born as commoners usually served in the enlisted ranks.

So my question is: is this, strictly speaking, necessary? That is, is there something in the very nature of modern warfare, or of running large military organizations, that requires this in order for things to work? Or is it just a historical artifact of the way things were done in early modern Europe?

Wikipedia informs me that in the US armed forces, "mustang" is the general slang term for someone who first served in the enlisted ranks, then successfully applied for officers' training, and is now a commissioned officer. So, in terms of US military slang, my question is: would it be plausible to have a fictional military in which all the commissioned officers are mustangs?

[Salmoneus]

Caveat: I'm not a military theorist, so this is just general knowledge combined with common sense...

So my question is: is this, strictly speaking, necessary? That is, is there something in the very nature of modern warfare, or of running large military organizations, that requires this in order for things to work? Or is it just a historical artifact of the way things were done in early modern Europe?

Neither.

It arose as an artifact of the way things are done almost everywhere, and has been preserved because it's a good idea. But it isn't necessary.

The three things, I think, that are likely to lead to this are (see below for third):

- societies are stratified - some rule, some are ruled. Rulers do not want to hand over all armed forces to the ruled (because then they would stop being rulers themselves - c.f the mamluks, etc). So the ruling class is always going to want to have its own people in charge of the armed forces - it's in their interest to make "commanding violence" and "coming from the ruling class" as much as possible synonymous. And, conversely, commanding a military company is fun, and prestigious, and the favoured sons of the ruling class will not want to have to fight on foot in the trenches for ten years as enlisted men before they get promoted! They want their fun miltiary holiday NOW, damnit!

- armies don't begin as state projects; they are commercial ventures at heart. As with any other company, they require both labour and capital: the subjects provide the labour, but they need to find a capitalist to provide their capital. [equipment; food; barracks; political legitimacy in the eyes of the sovereign; social capital to provide trust and information access with other military companies] That means that in most pre-modern armies, in some sort of way a rich, ruling-class guy is "hiring" the company and, naturally, they want to be in charge of it (see the first point).


These two points together mean that it's extremely likely that in most pre-modern armies, there will be a clear division between the company, on the one hand, and the captain, who funds the company and in return directs its activities. The details of this are different, depending on whether it's a feudal levy or a mercenary company or a man-o'-war or whatever, but in some way you're likely to get this sort of officer class.

Now, two exceptions spring to mind. First, there's what we might call the 'master and commander' loophole: while the officer class is going to want ultimate control of the company, they don't always demand daily micromanaging control. In the British navy at one time, following merchant navy practice, some ships had both a "commander", who decided where the ship was going to go, and a "master", who would give the appropriate orders to get it there. In a similar way, in some mediaeval armies, a great deal of power was held by sergeants and sergeants major - the professionals who knew what they were doing, and got everything sorted out while the lord-captains went off and caroused. This came to modern fruition with the Prussian system of the "general staff", a core of trained professional officers who "advised" the feudal commanders.

The other exception is that you can maybe partially get around class distinctions in a society with little sense of class, or a commitment to avoiding it. This is part of the reason why some city-states were disproportionately militarily powerful - because they were able to operate disciplined, professional militias in which promotion was by merit rather than by birth. This also contributed a core of professionalism to the Roman army even long after it ceased to be an urban militia. In this sort of system, the companies are not owned by their commanders, but by the State, and the State simply allocates commanders to the company. But of course, most pre-modern societies other than Rome (which developed its own problems!) were not able to so fully extend the dictatorial power of the State beyond the immediate confines of the capital, and therefore were reliant on various lords and magnates to in some way or other raise and maintain companies.


So, that's why an officer class develops, and how you maybe can avoid it. But then there's the third reason...

- different levels of command have very different skill requirements, which, particularly in the absence of modern professional training methods, rely on acquired experience. Being a good sergeant is a difficult skill-set that can take many years to acquire. So if every captain used to be a sergeant, which sergeants do you promote? The good sergeants? If you do, then your captains will all be quite old, and your generals will all be ancient. Or do you keep the good sergeants as sergeants? In which case, you're incentivising your sergeants to be bad at their job, to keep themselves free for promotion to lieutenant. At the very least, if you promote your promising sergeant candidates to be officers, you're going to run out of good sergeants. Structurally speaking, the army is a huge pyramid, and if you promote all your talent from bottom to top, you're going to a) have very old people at the top, and b) find all your talent being leached up to the top leaving not enough at the bottom. And because the skill sets you have to learn are different, you'll be investing a lot of time and resources to make people good sergeants, only to have them forget all about that and instead learn to be good captains.

So, one easy way to avoid these problems is to cut your pyramid in half, and make it so that you can start the top half without having done the bottom half; and, conversely, so that most of the knowledge and talent in the bottom half stays there. The natural social hierarchy and class structure tends to lead to this naturally; but even systems that try to avoid that may well find themselves replicating the enlisted/officer pyramid-cutting purely for practical reasons.

Now of course you might say: but this applies all over the pyramid! You're still training up good captains and having them throw that knowledge away to become good generals! Why isn't the pyramid cut in more places?

The answer is: it can be. Mediaeval armies often had, effectively, a 'general officer class', distinct from their 'field officer class' - the Prince of Gelderland did not first learn to command a small company before becoming a general, and while some really talented middle-class captains might end up promoted to general, it was a rare thing. And if we look at the bottom half of the pyramid, navies often distinguished a non-ruling sergeancy class - the sailing master, the master gunner, the boatswain, the navigator, the surgeon, etc, to varying degrees - who wouldn't usually be promoted to captain/commander, but who were also not necessarily promoted from the ordinary seamen. A concept in British history in this regard is the division not into two groups (officer/enlisted) but into three (commissioned officer/warrant officer/enlisted) - commissioned officers would (usually) be gentlemen, while warrant officers would be literate and numerate middle-class professionals (though experienced seamen could step up to be warrant officers eventually), and the rank and file would be lower class.

However, in general, modernisation has lead to the streamlining of the system. This is because there's tension between the above demands for specialisation and streaming, and on the other hand the tendency for baroque, segmented systems to be inefficient in allocating talent.

Wikipedia informs me that in the US armed forces, "mustang" is the general slang term for someone who first served in the enlisted ranks, then successfully applied for officers' training, and is now a commissioned officer. So, in terms of US military slang, my question is: would it be plausible to have a fictional military in which all the commissioned officers are mustangs?

Yes, I think it's plausible, but probably not likely.

It's probably likely in the case of a highly untrained, unorganised army - the idea of braves being promoted to raid leaders for a tribe, for example. It becomes less likely as you get more stratified societies (which push toward rank-specialisation for political-economic reasons) and as you get more complicated militaries (which pull toward rank-specialisation for reasons of efficiency).

One SF counterexample may be if you have much more effective talent-assessment, so that you can fast-track people directly to the rank they're best suited to. I don't think we can even really do that yet, but with more advanced psychological testing maybe we'll be able to.


And we should also distinguish two scenarios: the pyramid-promotion system (start at the bottom, get promoted rank by rank), and the talent-spotting system (start at the bottom, then zoom up to the 'appropriate' rank directly). Social stratification pushes toward the pyramid. However, the demands of rank-specialisation probably only really demand the latter, provided a sufficiently robust system of talent-spotting. I believe some militia-style forces have employed that system: everybody serves their term in the rank and file, and only then do the most talent (or richest, or best-connected, etc) soldiers get promoted to be officers.

[zompist]

Sal's outlined the good reasons the two-track system makes sense for a traditional society.

One thing I'd add: a lot depends on how frequent wars are. If they're nearly constant, or take place every 20 years, it's OK to let the aristocrats run them: they'll get actual experience, and the really awful ones will get dead. A period of prolonged peace, like the 19th century for Britain, is pretty bad for the system. Aristocratic generals made a mess of the Crimean War-- on the plus side, it gave Britain its favorite war poem, a poem about a disaster. I don't think the UK hit the ground running in WWI either.

In the US, we didn't have an aristocracy, but the first few years of the Civil War were largely spent burning through the incompetent generals.

So far as I know, you could certainly run (say) the US military entirely with promotions from below. It's already a volunteer army with a great emphasis on education. But I don't know that you'd really gain anything by eliminating the college-to-officer path.

[Raphael]

Thank you, that's all very informative! The reason why this is an issue in the first place is that my main conculture has a strong taboo, both cultural and legal, against given a young person any serious amount of power.

[mèþru]

You can easily solve that by making the officer track a long process.

[Salmoneus]

Or have the recruitment age be old. Iirc some classical army jobs had that requirement: you were meant to be a father and have your own land (ie your father had died) before you could enlist.

But I would remind you that anywhere other than modernity, almost everyone is young. Modern Ireland, at least as of a decade ago, has more than 50% of the population under the age of 25 - and the Irish at least have hospitals and pensions! Add a pre-modern birthrate to a pre-modern death rate, and you get a society inevitably dominated by youth. In 1970, 47% of Mexicans were under the age of 15 - along with over 40% of Koreans and Turks. [it's now only 14% of Koreans] Nearly 70% of Indians are still under 35. These figures would have been even higher before the modern era. And of course, the mediaeval life expectancy in Britain was around 30 for men - even those who survived to the age of 20 still only had a life expectancy of 45. There were old people around, and maximum lifespan was only slightly shorter than today - if you were rich, wise and lucky, you could have a very healthy lifestyle, particularly as cancer and heart disease were less common then - but they were a very small minority.


That doesn't preclude a society giving power to 'the elders'; indeed, that was common. Many societies either gave all power to the elders or at least had strict age limits for things (Roman positions had age limits - originally 32 for senator, 36 for aedile, 39 for praetor and 42 for consul, all with mandatory ten years military service first). But it does probably limit how effective it can be. Making all your generals be over 40 is no problem, but making every company captain be over 40 is going to severely impede your ability to mobilise as many troops as you'd like...

[Frislander]

Sal's outlined the good reasons the two-track system makes sense for a traditional society.

One thing I'd add: a lot depends on how frequent wars are. If they're nearly constant, or take place every 20 years, it's OK to let the aristocrats run them: they'll get actual experience, and the really awful ones will get dead. A period of prolonged peace, like the 19th century for Britain, is pretty bad for the system. Aristocratic generals made a mess of the Crimean War-- on the plus side, it gave Britain its favorite war poem, a poem about a disaster. I don't think the UK hit the ground running in WWI either.

Mind you, I'm not sure hitting the ground running would have helped much in that conflict.

Also with the whole "Charge of the Light Brigade" thing, it's not just there either, we seem to have a bit of a thing in the UK for memorialising "glorious defeats", see for instance Gordon's defence of Khartoum, or even the retreat from Dunkirk. Of course, I say "glorious" defeats - there has to be some indication of heroism, no matter how insane - hence why people remember Rourke's Drift and not Isandlwana.

[Hallow XIII]

For what it's worth, the Swiss army works exactly like this. But then it's also a very different beast from the imperial guard US Army.

[Salmoneus]

For what it's worth, the Swiss army works exactly like this. But then it's also a very different beast from the imperial guard US Army.

As I understand it, Swiss comissioned officer candidates are still diverted into officer cadet school after basic training, and do not have to pass through the NCO ranks, and most officers have not been NCOs, although AIUI promotion from NCO to commissioned officer is more common than in regular, non-militia armies. Is this no longer the case?

[Salmoneus]

Sal's outlined the good reasons the two-track system makes sense for a traditional society.

One thing I'd add: a lot depends on how frequent wars are. If they're nearly constant, or take place every 20 years, it's OK to let the aristocrats run them: they'll get actual experience, and the really awful ones will get dead. A period of prolonged peace, like the 19th century for Britain, is pretty bad for the system. Aristocratic generals made a mess of the Crimean War-- on the plus side, it gave Britain its favorite war poem, a poem about a disaster. I don't think the UK hit the ground running in WWI either.

Mind you, I'm not sure hitting the ground running would have helped much in that conflict.

Also with the whole "Charge of the Light Brigade" thing, it's not just there either, we seem to have a bit of a thing in the UK for memorialising "glorious defeats", see for instance Gordon's defence of Khartoum, or even the retreat from Dunkirk. Of course, I say "glorious" defeats - there has to be some indication of heroism, no matter how insane - hence why people remember Rourke's Drift and not Isandlwana.

It's a Victorian thing - the 19th century was very, very keen on tragedy. That faded in the 20th century for most of culture, but the bits of culture particularly associated with the upper class, like the military, maintained it. Famously, in the early 20th century, there was general adulation for Scott as the greatest national hero, because his mission failed utterly and everybody died entirely pointlessly. Shackleton, by contrast, was largely ignored, because none of his men died at all.

However, if you could show sterling virtue in the face of inescapable death, and then somehow escaped death, that could be even better. Victorian England was in awe of Albuera, for instance - to the extent that "die-hard" became a common description and the name of a political faction.

[M Mira]

The reason why this is an issue in the first place is that my main conculture has a strong taboo, both cultural and legal, against given a young person any serious amount of power.

If it's not about egalitarianism then it's easier. You can make junior officers ineligible to be a commanding officer, instead they start as staff officers in larger formations, and eventually get promoted to become a commander.

[Hallow XIII]

For what it's worth, the Swiss army works exactly like this. But then it's also a very different beast from the imperial guard US Army.

As I understand it, Swiss comissioned officer candidates are still diverted into officer cadet school after basic training, and do not have to pass through the NCO ranks, and most officers have not been NCOs, although AIUI promotion from NCO to commissioned officer is more common than in regular, non-militia armies. Is this no longer the case?

The precise model varied a lot; the reform 95 army had officer candidates spend 5 months as an NCO. Reform XXI got rid of that, although Officer candidates still passed through NCO cadet school. Currently it’s basic training, NCO school, two months as a sergeant, then officer school.

[Raphael]

The reason why this is an issue in the first place is that my main conculture has a strong taboo, both cultural and legal, against given a young person any serious amount of power.

If it's not about egalitarianism then it's easier. You can make junior officers ineligible to be a commanding officer, instead they start as staff officers in larger formations, and eventually get promoted to become a commander.

Thank you, that's a great idea!

[TomHChappell]

Isn’t it true in the Red Chinese military individuals have no rank? Rank attaches to their assignment rather than to the individual themself?

[masako]

So far as I know, you could certainly run (say) the US military entirely with promotions from below. It's already a volunteer army with a great emphasis on education. But I don't know that you'd really gain anything by eliminating the college-to-officer path.

The emphasis isn't so much on education as it is on obtaining some proof of attendance to a graduate-level institution. I realize this is a petty semantic difference, but it's an important one. I served, have worked, and still work with the military all of my adult life. The "emphasis" is not so much on merit, but ticking the box.

Eliminating the college-to-officer path and basing the promotion system to merit-based only would probably open it up to just as much cronyism as there already is, but it would curtail (to a point) some algebra whiz who needed money to pay-off some state college but can't read a map from leading a futile patrol through enemy territory.

I'd say, you'd gain a lot, Mark...a lot.

[k1234567890y]

Isn’t it true in the Red Chinese military individuals have no rank? Rank attaches to their assignment rather than to the individual themself?

it once was true, but it caused practical issues like the chaos in commanding, so they finally reintroduced military ranks.

[Ares Land]

I realized I missed a fairly obvious fictional examples. Starship Troopers works exactly that way.

It being an Heinlein book, you have a fair amount of rambling on why all armies ought to work that way. Now, that book is objectionable on many, many levels, but he did work out his fictional armies exceptionally well. Most objections are adressed and you really get the feeling the Mobile Infantry would work as described. (I suppose military history buffs or actually army officers would take it apart really quickly, but it certainly works as a work of fiction.)

[mèþru]

Rank attaches to their assignment rather than to the individual themself?

You can combine this with regular rank systems: a temporary promotion for a mission or brevet ranks
The US used the latter a lot in the Civil War. Many people thought of as Civil War generals were not actually generals in the regular army but mere colonels or majors that rapidly rose in the brevetted ranks.

[Raphael]

Rank attaches to their assignment rather than to the individual themself?

You can combine this with regular rank systems: a temporary promotion for a mission or brevet ranks
The US used the latter a lot in the Civil War. Many people thought of as Civil War generals were not actually generals in the regular army but mere colonels or majors that rapidly rose in the brevetted ranks.

Leading to much confusion among people reading about the period who aren't familiar with that system.